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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objectives of the dissertation
This dissertation analyzes an undeveloped oil field under output price
uncertainty and investment decision flexibility. The essence is to obtain
the optimal management strategy and the value of the project. For
these purposes we use the concept of contingent claims analysis.
Several alternative investment situations are considered. For each
case, the optimal strategy is provided, stated in terms of an easily
implemented break-even price rule. Our results indicate that man-
agement can increase the project value substantially when contingent
claims analysis is applied.
Some possible regulations which may be imposed on an undeveloped
oil field, e.g., through legislation, is also examined. The cost to the
owner of the field is evaluated in the contingent claims framework by
interpreting the regulation as a constraint on the set of feasible decision
strategies, and by obtaining tlie Induced opportunity loss.
The dissertation contains two results deserving particular interest:
In a Black-Scholes economy, we derive the pricing function for two
contingent claims, both providing a pay-off at the future maturity date
described by the power function of the price of the underlying asset at
that date. The future pay-off from one of the claims is made conditional
on the price of the underlying asset at the maturity date being lower
than some preset level. The future pay-off from the other claim is made
conditionalon the price of the underlying asset being below some preset
5
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level' for the entire period from the current date and until the maturity
date.P
1.2 Methodology
The basic idea of contingent claims analysis' is that the value of the
project must conform to the condition of no risk-free arbitrage oppor-
tunity." The implication of this condition may briefly be explained as
follows: Suppose t!J.(i.Lit is possible to replicate the future stochastic
cash flow.from-th~ project bY-managing a portfolioo{assets ira-de-c{m
the market according to a dynamic strategy. In that case; t~~ule out
a risk-free arbitrage opportunity, the value of the project is required to
be identical to the market value of the replicating portfolio.
The idea of evaluating a project by using the market prices of un-
derlying assets, and by imposing the condition of flo risk-free arbitrage,
is not new. 5 Consider for instance the case of certainty, where the risk-
free rate of interest is constant, and where the project pays one dollar
at date one, and one dollar at date two. Suppose that two one-dollar
discount bonds, maturing at date one and at date two, respectively,
are traded in the market. The future cash flow from the project may
then be replicated in the market by holding a portfolio consisting of one
bond maturing at date one, and another bond maturing at date two.
To rule out riskless arbitrage, the value of the project must be identical
to the value of the replicating portfolio. Indeed, thiscorresponds to ~he
value obtained by the net present value method when using the correct
:!~~k-Jr:ee-discountrate.
The idea may similarly be applied to the case of uncertainty. Con-
lThe level is described by an exponential function of calendar time, and includes
the special case of a constant level.
2The two results are presented in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.
3For a survey of contingent claims analysis, see, e.g., Smith (1976) and (1979)
and Mason and Merton (1985).
4A risk-free arbitrage opportunity may be interpreted as the existence of a "free
lunch" or a "money pump" in the economy. The corrdition is further discussed in
Chapter 2.
5For an introduction to the evaluation of assets hy the no-arbitrage principle,
see, e.g., Rubinstein (1987) and Vcirian (1987). .
•
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sider a project, at date one providing a cash flow corresponding to the
stochastic price of a stock at that date, and at date two providing a
similar cash flow dependent on the stock price at that date. Further-
more, suppose that the stock, which is traded in the market, pays no
dividends during the two periods. Clearly, the future cash flow from the
project may then be replicated in the market by acquiring two stocks
immediately, and by selling one stock at each of the two future dates.
To prevent riskless arbitrage, the current value of the project must be
twice the current price of the stock.
The optimal exercise strategy when holding a European call option, .
written on a stock, is to exercise the option at the fixed future expiration
date if and only if the stock price at that date exceeds the exercise
price. The key insight of Black and Scholes (1973), leading to the
famous pricing formula of the European call option, is that the future
pay-off from the option in their model may be replicated in the market
by a portfolio of risk-free bonds and the stock itself. In contrast to
our two examples just above, the self-financing replicating strategy is
in this case required to be dynamic and made contingent on the future
development of the risky stock price. The reason for this complex
replicating strategy is that the owner of theoption faces both future
u!l~e!!_~!Iltyft~~_s~!()c~price attiie expiration date)a:n(Cf~t~re .g~~!~i2n
fl.exibili1Yd(wh~th~Ltg.e~~rcis~OL IlQt (l,t the expiration date) .
.r Suppose that we use the net present value method to evaluate the
European call option. With the Black-Scholes assumptions on the price
dynamics of the stock, it is fairly straighforward to obtain the expected
future cash flow." To determine the risk-adjusted discount rate is, how-
ever, not an easy task. In general, it depends on the current stock price.
The European call option is a fairly simple asset. It may be exer-
cised at one fixed future date only, and. the value is zero if not exercised
at that date. Thus, the optimal strategy at the future maturity date,
is simply to compare the observable stock price at that date with the
exercise price, and to exercise if and only if the former exceeds the lat-
ter. Consider for instance a more complex call option, where exercise
is possible at several alternative preset dates. To maximize the value
of the asset, the exercise strategy at each decision date requires a com-
6The expected cash flow corresponds to the expected value of a log-normal ran-
dom variable.
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parision of the intrinsic value and the option value, where the latter is
computed by the net present value method. Clearly, the exercise strat-
egy for each future decision date will affect the current assessments of
both the expected future cash flow and the corresponding risk-adjusted
discount rate, with consequences both to the current option value and
the current optimal exercise decision.
The starting point of this dissertation is the evaluation of an unde-
veloped oil field. A project of this type is exposed to several sources of
uncertainty, of which some are project specific. For instance, the total
extractable quantity of oil, the total cost, and their distribution through
time. Uncertainty may also be induced by more general factors, such as
technological innovations, political changes, and fluctuation of market
prices.
Contingent claims analysis provides a consistent conceptual frame-
work in order to evaluate a future cash flow with future decision flexi-
bility, and where the uncertainty æaYQ~~r~lateq to. th~ future ~ev~1QQ-
mentgim~Iket pr1Ce.S(;rt~~d~d as~~ts~ With'the d~~i~~'-t'~-~~pi~it thi~
comparative advantage of contingent claims analysis, we have chosen
to focus the spot price of output (oil) as the source of uncertainty.
Other sources of uncertainty are not considered in this dissertation,
in order to keep the basic structure of the models simple, providing
decision rules to be fairly easily implemented to practical problems."
Furthermore, when considering an undeveloped oil field, we particu-
larly focus the flexibility related to the investment decision. The reason
is that oil projects to a large degree are irreversible once undertaken,
due to the cost structure.f
The basic idea of this dissertation is to interpret the undeveloped
oil field as a contingent claim, with output as the underlying asset.
We examine several degrees of investment decision flexibility, taking
explicitly into account the opportunity to defer the investment decision
itself, and make it at some later date dependent upon the spot output
price at that date. The results are compared with more "traditional"
models.
71t is well known, for instance from decision tree analysis, that adding on extra
state variables increase the problem dramatically.
8Many oil projects are characterised by large investment and fixed production
costs, as compared to the variable production costs.
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1.3 Relations to existing literature
Myers (1984) notes the current gap between finance theory and strate-
gic planning, and concludes that contingent claims analysis seems to
be the most promising area of research for bridging this gap," Ma-
son and Merton (1985) divides the development of contingent claims
analysis into "past", "present", and "future" applications, the latter
representing the applications which are still in the development stage
within academic research but which hold forth the promise of becoming
a part of financial practice in the future. This dissertation attempts to
contribute to this "future" category of contingent claims analysis.
McDonald and Siegel (1986) derives an analytical solution to the
value of a perpetual investment opportunity, where the investment de-
cision is irreversible. Both the investment cost and the value 'of the
project if undertaken are described by a geometric Brownian motion.'?
In this dissertation we outline a model of the economy and of the oil
field if developed, where holding a non-expiring licence to the oil reserve
leads to a special case of the general evaluation problem solved in the
mentioned article.
Majd and Pindyck (1987) considers the case where it takes time to
invest. The investment is modeled as a sequence of decisions, where the
manager at each point in time has the opportunity either to implement
investments as scheduled or to wait. The optimal decision is made
contingent on the stochastic value of a similar completed project ready
for production.
Pindyck (1988) focuses on a producing company, and the interrela-
tion between the capasity choice, the optimal production quantity, and
the uncertainty with respect to the demand function of the output of
the firm.
In this dissertation, we do not model the flexibility examined in the
two latter articles. Rather, we assume that the project is irrevocable
once undertaken, and that output is extracted according to a fixed
preset production plan.'!
90verviews of the theory of contingent claims analysis are found in Smith (1976)
and (1979) .
. lOThe geometric Brownian motion is discussed in Chapter 2.
uThe latter assumption is relaxed in Chapter 7.
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Tourinho (1979) is one of the first contributions implementing con-
tingent claims analysis to evaluate a natural resource.
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) models a copper mine as a contingent
claim with the stochastic spot output price as the source of uncertainty.
The authors mainly consider operating flexibility, and characterize op-
timal strategies for closing and opening the mine temporarily, and the
associated mine value.P This dissertation adapts a model of the econ-
omy similar to the one outlined in Brennan and Schwartz. Our focus,
however, is on the investment decision.
Paddock, Siegel, and Smith (1988) considers an offshore petroleum
lease as a contingent claim, using one unit of developed hydrocarbon
reserve rather than one unit of output as the underlying asset. To
obtain numerical results, the authors have to resort to a dubious "one-
third" rule of thumb outside their model.P
Both Lund (1987) and MacKie-Mason (1987) examine the effect of
a stochastic output price and a non-linear tax system on the project
value and the optimal strategies. The former considers the case of the
Norwegian petroleum sector, whereas the latter analyzes the case of
mining. We do not take taxes into account in this dissertation.
1.4 Overview of the subsequent chapters
To implement the concept of contingent claims analysis, it is necessary
to specify the model of the economy and to describe the characteristics
of the project itself.
In Chapter 2 the economy is discussed. We make explicit assump-
tions on the spot price dynamics of output, and the value of a future
claim on output relative to the current spot price.l" The risk-free rate of
interest is assumed constant and known. Furthermore, the economy is
assumed to be frictionless and without risk-free arbitrage opportunies.
This model of the economy leads to three evaluation rules characteriz-
ing the price of a contingent claim.
12Brennan and Schwartz (1986) is a popularized version of this article.
13Siegel, Smith, and Paddock (1987) is a popularized version of this article.
14The spot output price follows a geometric Brownian motion. The current value
of a future claim on output is the current spot price, discounted back at the constant
rate of return shortfall (convenience yield).
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In Chapter 3, we describe the project in the case where the invest-
ment decision is already made, and assume there is no operating or
abandonment flexibility. This means that the oil field may be repre-
sented by a fixed preset production schedule and a corresponding cost
schedule. The value of the developed oil field is a linear function of
the current spot output price. We also present our set of base case
parameter values, which is used to illustrate the models derived in the
later chapters.
We then consider the investment decision. Investment is modeled as
undertaking a commitment to extract oil according to the fixed preset
production schedule and to pay the future costs.
Chapter 4 deals with "traditional" investment decision models. First,
we analyze the accept/reject case, where the manager at the decision
date choose between initiating the project immediately or never. Sec-
ond, we introduce the additional opportunity to choose - once and for all
- the future date to start development. Break-even prices and project
values are obtained for both cases.
;
In Chapter 5 we use the contingent claims framework to evaluate
an opportunity to make an accept/reject investment decision at a fixed
future date. In this case, the undeveloped oil field represents a future
right, but no obligation, to acquire the future oil production by paying
the future costs. By interpreting this investment opportunity as a Eu-
ropean call option, we apply the famous Black-Scholes option pricing
formula to obtain the current value of the oil field.
In Chapter 6, investment may be undertaken at any date, rather
than on a fixed future date only. In the case where the investment op-
portunity is non-expiring, we present an analytical solution to the value
of the undeveloped oil field and the trigger price indicating immediate
investment.
In Chapter 7, we introduce operating managerial flexibility, and
analyze the opportunity to costlessly switch the production on and off
temporarily. By assuming exponentially declining production (if any),
we provide the analytical solution to the field value and the trigger
price associated with the optimal switching strategy. Our numerical
results indicate that the future switching flexibility may be ignored
when analyzing an investment opportunity.
In Chapter 8, we present our result evaluating a claim on a pay-off
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at a fixed future date, described by a power function of the price of the
underlying asset at that date. The claim is contingent on the price of
the underlying asset at the future date being lower than some preset
level. This result has several interesting applications, and is used in
this chapter to evaluate the costs of imposing a temporary freeze on
development of an oil reserve.
In Chapter 9, we derive the value of a claim with a similar future
pay-off as above. The pay-off is assumed contingent on the price of
the underlying asset being lower than some preset level for the entire
period from the current evaluation date and until the maturity date.
The result is used to analyze a promise to develop an oil reserve before
a fixed future date.
Chapter 10 contains some concluding remarks.
Chapter 2
THE ECONOMY
2.1 Introduction
This dissertation implements contingent claims analysis to evaluate an
undeveloped oil field in the case of output price uncertainty and invest-
ment decision flexibility. It is then necessary to make assumptions on
both the economy and the project. This chapter is devoted to the econ-
omy. We outline an economy similar to Brennan and Schwartz (1985),
and present three implied evaluation rules of contingent claims.
2.2 Assumptions
Our first basic assumption is that the dynamics of the spot price of oil
S(t) is described by a geometric Brownian motion, defined by
dS(t)
S(t) = adi + O"dZ(t) (2.1 )
The term a represents the instantaneous trend (if any), and O"is the
instantaneous standard deviation of the relative price change per time
unit.! The term dZ(t) corresponds to the increment of the standard
Brownian motion.P In words, Eq. (2.1) states that successive relative
lWe assume that both a and (T are constant through time.
2The increments of the standard Brownian motion are identically distributed
normal random variables with E(dZ) = O and E(dZ2) = dt, and uncorrelated
13
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price changes are identically distributed normal random variables, and
uncorrelated across time.
The assumed price dynamics may equivalently be stated in terms
of the uncertain spot price at the future date t', given the spot price at
the current date t. Eq. (2.1) then translates into
S(t') = S(t)e(a-tu2)(tl-tJ+uZ(t'-t) (2.2)
where S(t) is the current spot price and the term Z(t) represents the
standard Brownian motion.P From Eq. (2.2) it is easy to see that the
logarithmic rate In(S(t')j S(t)) is normally distributed.t This means
that the spot price S(t') at some future date t', given the current spot
price S(t), is log-normally distributed.!
The assumed price dynamics implies that the spot price of oil follows
a continuous sample path, with no jumps. The price path may thus be
drawn without lifting the pencil from the paper.
Our second basic assumption is that there exists a traded asset inV
the market, with relative return perfectly-~d with the relative j\
return of the spot price of oil, and with identical volatility <7.6
across time, with E[dZ(t)dZ(t')] = O for all t ::I t', For a brief introduction to
stochastic calculus, see Smith (1979).
3The Brownian motion Z(t) is normally distributed with expectation E(Z) = O
and variance E(Z2) = t.
4It is normal with parameters
E[ln(S(t')j S(t))]
Var[ln(S(t')j S(t))]
(a - t(2)(t' - t)
u2(t' - t)
SThe exponent in Eq. (2.2) is normal. The spot price S(t') at the future date
t', given the current spot price S(t), is thus by definition log-normally distributed,
with expected value
Et[S(t')] = S(t)ea(t'-t)
see, e.g., Ingersoll (1987) p. 14. _~
6This "twin asset" need not necessarily to exist as a separate traded asset in th:1
market. It is sufficient that its value can be replicated in the market by a portfolio
of traded assets equipped with an appropriate dynamic self-financing strate~ _
The "twin asset" may for instance be interpreted as the marginal unit of the phys-
ical output (oil) in stock to a holder with positive optimal storage. Alternatively,
the "twin asset" may be the value of a self-financing portfolio containing futures
contracts on oil, or shares of stocks in oil companies, and riskless bonds.
2.2. ASSUMPTIONS
The relation between the equilibrium required rate of return of this
"twin as~~~', a, and the growth rate of the expected oil price, a, is
8=a-a>O (2.3)
Note that the rate 8 is independent of whether both a and a are mea-
sured in nominal or in real terms."
The term 8 may be interpreted as the "rate of return shortfall"
related to oil. 8 [trepresents the_~(tt~QLreturn forgone from holding oil
if merely receivingreturn thr()ggh lh~prLce change of oil. An analogy
is 8 being The-contin!l:911s qi"yi~~IJ.ApaY:()l!tr.(tt~ <!1! Cl. sto~_k.
Alternatively, 8 may be considered as the "net marginal convenience
yield" related to oil, reflecting the net benefit from the marginal unit of
output in stock relative to a claim on future delivery of output." With
this interpretation, § is~imil~!~_~()_~h~Jig_l!!~i_~x_premil,lmJIQJ!Lh_2Jill1}K_
cash.
-~-The assumption of 8 > O implies that there is an_()JW.Qriunity_~os_t
of having ()i_l in thegrou~d.lO
Th~-risk-i~~~-~~te-ofillterest r > Ois constant and known. Riskless
borrowing and lending at this rate r, are unrestricted.
Investors are assumed to prefer more to less, and to be risk averse.
They are required to agree on the volatitily a of the spot price of oil.
Investors need not necessarily to agree on the size of a or a, but only
on their difference 8 == a-a.
We assume that the economy is frictionless, with continuous trad-
ing, and no sources to imperfections such as taxes, transaction costs,
or short sale restrictions. The economy is characterized by no risk-free
arbitrage opportunities.
We now make some comments on the economy described just above.
If the future cash flow from a project may be replicated by managing a
portfolio of traded assets according to a dynamic self-financing strategy,
7We assume that both a and 8 are constant through time.
8See McDonald and Siegel (1984) and Pindyck (1988).
9Brennan and Schwartz (1985) use a constant rate 8 when evaluating a copper
mine. Brennan (1989) and Gibson and Schwartz (1989) analyze some alternative
models of the convenience yield.
10This opportunity cost resolves the "extraction paradox" , discussed in Tourinho
(1979).
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the no-arbitrage condition requires the value of the project to be equal
to the value of the replicating portfolio. Suppose for the moment that a
replicating strategy exists, and that arbitrage is possible. In that case,
investors may earn a risk-free profit by selling the overpriced portfolio
and buying the underpriced one. The actions of the arbitrageurs will
force the prices to adjust. Equilibrium is reached when the arbitrage
opportunity has vanished, that is, when the price of the project and
the price of the replicating portfolio are equal.
In this economy, a negative current price S(t) is ruled out. To
see this, suppose for the moment that S(t) < o. In that case, it is
possible to obtain a risk-free profit -S(t) > O by "buying" the asset
and abandoning it costlessly, thus violating the no-arbitrage condition.
Furthermore, we note from Eq. (2.2) that the assumed price process
rules out negative future prices S(t').
From Eq. (2.2), it follows that a current price S(t) = O implies
S(t') = Ofor all future dates t' > t as well. Suppose that the stochastic
price S(t') at some future date t' is positive with a positive probability.
With investors preferring more to less, the asset clearly must command
a positive current price in the market, and we thus have S(t) > O. Now,
suppose instead that the price S(t') = Ofor all future dates t' > t, and
that the current price S(t) > O. In that case it is possible to make
a risk-free profit of S(t) by selling the asset short, and reversing the
position without costs at the future date t', violating the no-arbitrage
condition.
2.3 Three evaluation rules
To rule out riskless arbitrage opportunities, the prices in this economy
must conform to the following evaluation rules: First, the value at the
date t of receiving one riskless dollar at the future date i' is
Vt[Y(t') = 1] = e-r(t'-t) (2.4)
where Y(t') is the certain future cash flow, and Vt[·] is a general evalu-
ator.
Second, the value at date t of a claim on one unit of output at the
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future date t' is
Vt[Y(t') = S(t')] = e-S(t'-t) S(t) (2.5)
where Y(t') is the random future cash flow, and S(t) is the spot price
at the evaluation date. II In this economy, the equilibrium futures price
at date t of a hypothetical futures contract with delivery date t' is
Ft(S(t), t') = e(r-8)(t'-t)S(t)
see Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and Ross (1978).
Third, consider an asset whose future pay-off can be written as a
function of calendar time t and the price of output S(t) only. The asset
pays a continuous instantaneous cash flow to its holder Ddt = D( S, t )dt.
This asset may be interpreted as a contingent claim, with market value
U(5, t). To prevent arbitrage in our economy, its market value U(S, t)
must satisfy the partial differential equation
see, e.g., Merton (1977).12 To obtain the market value of the asset, we
must specify the boundary conditions.
The future claim on one dollar, and the future claim on one unit of
output, may be interpreted as contingent claims. It is easy to verify
that both Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5) satisfy the partial differential equation,
Eq. (2.6).
llThis evaluation rule, implied by the no-arbitrage condition, is consistent with
the RADR-method. According to the latter, the current value of the claim is found
by discounting back the expected future cash flow at the equilibrium rate of return.
That is,
Vt[Y(t') = S(t')] = e-å(t'-t)Et[S(t')]
By inserting the expected future spot price, given in footnote 5, and by using the
definition of 6, Eq. (2.3) above, we obtain Eq. (2.5).
12Eq. (2.6) is found by translating Eq. (1) in the mentioned article into our
notation. Furthermore, the dividends Dl related to the underlying asset in Merton's
model is identical to 6S(t) in our economy.
18 CHAPTER 2. THE ECONOMY
Chapter 3
THE PROJECT
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we described and discussed the economy. In
this chapter, we turn to the project.
We assume that the project when undertaken may be represented
by a fixed preset production schedule and a corresponding fixed preset
cost schedule. This means that there is no operating or abandonment
flexibility related to the developed oil field. For many oil projects, this
description is realistic due to the cost structure.
With our assumptions on the project we evaluate a commitment to
initiate investments immediately. Finally, we present a numerical base
case which will be used to illustrate our results in the next chapters.
3.2 Assumptions
Our basic assumption on the project is that, once undertaken, it may
be described by a given production schedule, q( Tit), and a given cost
schedule, b( Tit), where t is the initiation date and T is the project
time.
This means that the project is irreversible once undertaken.' More-
1Majd and Pindyck (1987) consider the case where it takes time to build, and
where the investment decision is a sequence of decisions rather one irrevocable
decision.
19
20 CHAPTER 3. THE PROJECT
over, when initiated, there is no flexibility to reschedule the production,
or to abandon the project.?
In several decision situations considered in the following chapters,
the holder has the flexibility to initiate investments at future dates as
well. We assume that if investments are initiated at some future date t'
rather that at the current date t, the production schedule, considered
as a function of project time r , is unchanged. That is,
q(-r I t) = q(-r) (3.1)
Furthermore, initiating at the future date t' rather that at the current
date t causes the entire cost schedule to shift upwards at the exponential
rate 7r < r. Stated formally, we assume
b(-r I t') = e11'(t'-t)b(-r I t) (3.2)
where t' and t are alternative initiation dates.
3.3 The commitment value
Now, consider a project identical to the one described in Section 3.2,
where the irrevocable investment decision just has been made. In this
case, there is by assumption no decision flexibility left. The oil field may
thus be interpreted as a claim on future delivery of oil according to the
fixed production schedule in Eq, (3.1), combined with an obligation to
repay a loan incurred according to the cost schedule in Eq. (3.2).
By using the two evaluation rules in Chapter 2, Eqs, (2.4) and (2.5),
it is easy to verify that at the current date t, the value of a commitment
to initiate immediately is
C(S(t), t) = AS(t) - B(t) (3.3)
where we define
(3.4)
and
(3.5)
2The latter assumption is relaxed in Chapter 7.
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The constant A may be interpreted as the time-adjusted quantity of
oil. It represents the quantity of oil received immediately that is equiv-
alent to receiving the total quantity of oil in the field, Q = J q( T)dT,
according to the fixed production schedule q( T). The constant B( t) is
the present value of future investment- and production costs at date t, '
given immediate development.
Note that the current value of the oil field, conditionalon develop-
ment being initiated immediately, is linear in the current spot price of
oil S(t). This is a concequence of no decision flexibility being left, and
thus no opportunity for the manager to respond to oil price changes.
The value of the project C(S(t), t) increases, ceteris paribus, with
a higher current spot price of oil, with a lower rate of return shortfall
8, and with a higher riskless interest rate r,
3.4 A base case example
Throughout this dissertation, we illustrate our results with a numerical
example. We use the following numerical values
Rate of return shortfall 8 0.06
Risk-free interest rate r 0.05
Cost escalation rate Jr 0.00
Output price variance a2 0.07
where all numbers are continuously compounded on an annual basis.
The spot output price is quoted in terms of USD per barrel.
The project is described by
Discounted quantity of output A
Discounted total costs B
130 Mill. barrels
1040 Mill. USD
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Chapter 4
TRADITIONAL MODELS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we proceed to the investment decision. First, we con-
sider the case where the investor is to choose between to accept the
project immediately, or to reject it forever. Second, we introduce ad-
ditional flexibility at the investment decision date by including the op-
portunity - once and for all - to fix a future date at which the project
is to be initiated.
For both cases, we obtain the break-even price and the value of the
undeveloped oil field given the optimal investment strategy. The results
in this chapter are used as benchmarks when we later proceed to the
contingent claims analysis.
4.2 Accept/reject
Consider an undeveloped oil field that, once undertaken, is similar to
a commitment to extract oil (see Section 3.3). Suppose the holder at
the current investment decision date is to choose between to accept
the project or to reject it. The decision flexibility is thus whether to
undertake a commitment to initiate the project immediately or never.
The current value of the undeveloped oil field, contingent on the
optimal decision being made, is
V(S(t), t) = maxi C(S(t), t), O} (4.1 )
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where C(S(t), t) is the value of a commitment to initiate investments
immediately, given by Eq. (3.3). The optimal decision in this case is
Reject
Accept
if S(t) < SBE(t)
if S(t) ~ SBE(t) (4.2)
where SBE(t) is the accept/reject break even-price, defined by
B(t)
SBE(t) =A (4.3)
In Eq. (4.3), A and B(t) are given by Eqs. (3.4) and (3.5), respectively.
It is straightforward to show that the break-even price increases with
a higher rate of return shortfall 8 and a lower risk-free interest rate r.
The value of the oil field is
V(S(t), t) = { ~S(t) _ B(t)
if S(t) < SBE(t)
if S(t) ~ SBE(t) (4.4)
V(S(t), t) represents a linear function of the current spot price of oil
S(t), with a kink at S(t) = SBE(t).
4.3 Optimal timing
In the accept/reject model above, there were only two decision alter-
natives available to the investor. Now, suppose that we in addition
introduce the opportunity - once and for all - to fix a future date at
which investments are to be initiated. This timing decision is irrevo-
cable, as is the case with the accept and the reject alternatives. When
fixed, the future initiation date T may not be changed, even if so de-
sired.
At the fixed future date T, the undeveloped oil field represents a
commitment to initiate immediately. From Eq. (3.3), we know that the
value at the future date T of this commitment is C(S(T), T), depending
on the stochastic spot price S(T) at that date. By using the evaluation
rules in Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5), we find that the current value of fixing
the future initiation date T is
C(S(t), T) Vt[C(S(T), T)]
e-c5(T-t) AS(t) - e-(r-7r)(T-t) B(t) (4.5)
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where Vt[·] is a general evaluator, A and B(t) are defined by Eqs, (3.4)
and (3.5), and 'Tr is the cost escalation rate.!
Given the optimal choice, the value of the undeveloped oil field is
V(S(t), t) = max {max C(S(t), T), O}
T>t
where the future initiation date T is the decision variable.
By assumption, the rate of return shortfall h is positive, c.f. Eq. (2.3).2
Now, suppose for the moment that r - 'Tr ~ O< h. In that case, we see
directly from Eq, (4.5) that the current value of the future commitment
C(S(t), T) is a decreasing function of the initiation date T. This means
that fixing a later initiation date is inferior to initiate immediately. The
decision thus collaps into the accept/reject situation examined above.
With the parameter values O < r - 'Tr = h, the current value of a
commitment to initiate at date T, Eq, (4.5), may be written as the
value of immediate initiation, C(S(t), t), discounted back at the pos-
itive rate r - n . The sign of C(S(t), T) is then identical to the sign
of C(S(t), t), and fixing a later initiation date will reduce its absolute
value. Thus, with C(S(t), t) positive, immediate development is opti-
mal. If C(S(t), t) is negative, the latest possible initiation date is the
"optimal" one, but inferior to rejecting the project. In this case, fixing
a future initiation date T > t is never the optimal choice, and we are
thus left with the accept/reject decision situation.
With O< r - 'Tr < h, the interior solution of the first-order condition
of C(S(t), T) wrt. T (if any) represents a minimum.' The optimal
1From Section 3.2, we recall that the entire cost schedule escalates exponentially
with rate 7r if the initiation date is deferred, see Eq. (3.2). This assumption implies
that
B(T) = e'll"CT-t) B(t)
where T and t are alternative initiation dates.
2Suppose for the moment that 6 ~ O,and r - 7r > O. We then see from Eq. (4.5)
that C(S(t), T) is an increasing function of T, and it is thus optimal to delay the
initiation as long as possible. With T unbounded, the optimal choice is T* = 00,
leading to an infinitely large project value if 6 < O, and to the project ValueQS(t)
if 6 = O. In an economy with these parameter values, there is no incentive to turn
"oil in the ground" into producing oil fields. This situation corresponds to the
"extraction paradox" in Tourinho (1979).
3The first- and the second-order conditions are found in footnote 5 below.
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initiation date is T = t or T = 00, and the holder is thus left with
accept and reject as the relevant decision alternatives."
Now, the case of O< S < r - 7r remains to be discussed. With no
restrictions on the latest possible initiation date T, the optimal decision
at date t, contingent on the current spot price of oil S(t), is
Initiate at date T* if S(t) < SOT(t)
Initiate immediately if S(t) ~ SOT(t) (4.6)
where both T* and SOT(t) are defined below.
The optimal future initiation date T* ~ t is given by the expression
T*(S(t)) = t + max {o, ln(SoT(t)/ S(t))} (4.7)
(r-7r)-S
and is a decreasing function of the current spot price S(t).5
The critical price, indicating that T* = t, is
(r - 7r)SOT(t) = -S- SBE(t) (4.8)
where the accept/reject break even-price SBE(t) is defined by Eq. (4.3).
We note that the critical price SOT(t) indicating immediate investment,
is higher than the break-even price SBE.
4With 8 > 0, it is easy to see from Eq. (4.5) that
lim C(S(t), T) :S O
T ......oo
for all r - 11", and thus inferior to rejecting the project.
5The optimal future initiation date T* is determined by solving the first-order
condition
aC(S(t), T) = _8e-6(T-t) AS(t) + (r _ 1I")e-(r-or)(T-t) B(t) = °aT
with respect to T. In the case of 0< 8 < r - 11", it is easy to see that we have
and the solution T* > t (if any) thus represents a maximum.
4.4. CONCL USIONS 27
The value of the oil field in the optimal timing case is
V(S(t) t) = { C(S(t), T*)
, C(S(t), t)
if S(t) < SOT
if S(t) :2: SOT (4.9)
With S(t) < SOT(t), the current value of the oil field contingent on
fixing the optimal initiation date T*, is a convex function of the current
spot price S(t). It converges to zero when S --+ O. With S(t) :2:
SOT, accepting the project is optimal, and the value of the investment
opportunity is identical to a commitment to initiate immediately.
4.4 Conclusions
When considering immediate investment, this action must be compared
to the best possible alternative if the present value is to be maximized.
In many cases, where uncertainty and flexibility are present, neither
turning the project down forever nor fixing a future initiation date once
and for all, represent this "best alternative". The two traditional mod-
els above, allowing for strategies that are determined by calendar time
only, may lead to non-optimal decisions, possibly inducing a substantial
opportunity loss.
28 CHAPTER 4. TRADITIONAL MODELS
Chapter 5
FUTURE
ACCEPT /REJECT
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider an undeveloped oil reserve where the de-
cision flexibility corresponds to a future accept/reject investment de-
cision. This problem is similar to the evaluation of a European call
option. With a suitable reinterpretation of parameters, we use the
Black-Scholes option pricing formula to obtain the current value of the
oil field. We show some practical applications of the result.
5.2 The future accept/reject decision
Consider an undeveloped oil field that, once undertaken, represents a
commitment to extract oil, as discussed in Chapter 3. Assume that the
decision flexibility corresponds to an accept/reject investment decision
to be made at the fixed future date T.
This may be the situation, for instance, if the oil reserve is unprof-
itable to develop on its own, but where idle processing and transporta-
tion capacity from a neighboring oil field will be available at date T.
Another example may be that the licence requires the holder to re-
frain from initiating development before the future date T, and that
the licence expires if investments are not undertaken at that date.
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If development is initiated at the future date T, the oil field repre-
sents by assumption a commitment to extract oil. However, the project
will be undertaken at that date only if optimal, and the future value of
the oil field is thus
Yc(S(T), T) = max{AS(T) - B(T), O}
The optimal decision is to develop at date T if the future spot price
S(T) equals or exceeds the break-even price SBE(T) = B(T)/ A. The
future value of the investment opportunity is a linear function of the
stochastic future spot price S(T), with a kink at S(T) = SBE(T).
For the holder of the future accept/reject opportunity, it is possible
though not optimal, to undertake an immediate commitment to initiate
at the future decision date. Alternatively, he may promise today to
reject the project at date T. The current value of the undeveloped oil
field We is thus bounded from below by the value of choosing the "best"
of the two mentioned non-optimal strategies. We may thus conclude
that
We ~ max{C(S(t),T),O}
where C(S(t), T) is defined by Eq. (4.5).
The two discounting rules in Chapter 3, evaluating future claims
on one unit of output and one riskless dollar, are not appropriate to
find We. By examining Yc(S(T), T), however, we see that the future
, value corresponds to the pay-off at the maturity date from A European
call options, each written on one unit of output and with exercise price
SBE(T).l By a suitable reinterpretation of the parameters in the Black-
Scholes call option pricing formula, we obtain that the current value of
the future accept/reject investment opportunity is2
We == Vt[max{AS(T) - B(T),O}]
1It is easy to see that the value of the accept/reject opportunity at the future
date T equivalently may be written
Yc(S(T), T) = A max{S(T) - SBE(T), O}
where SBE(T) is the break-even price at that date.
2First, we interpret one unit of output as the underlying asset (one share of
stock), following a geometric Brownian motion. The rate of return shortfall 6 then
corresponds to a continuous dividend pay-out rate on this stock. Second, we inter-
pret the future accept/reject break-even price SBE(T) as the exercise price of the
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where N[·] is the cumulative normal probability function. The con-
stants dl and d2 are defined by
In(S(t)/SBE(t)) + (r -'Jr - 6 + !0-2)(T - t)
o-JT - t
(5.2)
(5.3)
In Section 8.4, we obtain Eqs. (5.1) - (5.3) as a special case.
The current value of the future accept/reject investment opportu-
nity We is increasing and convex in the current spot price S(t). With
S(t) being low, the probability that the oil field will be developed at
date T is close to zero, and we have the limit
lim Wc = O
S(t)-O
With a high current spot price, the probability that the project will be
accepted at date T approaches one. The future accept/reject invest-
ment opportunity then converges to a corresponding commitment to
intitiate development. We have thus argued that
lim We = C(S(t), T)
S(t)-oo
The value We increases with a lower rate of return shortfall 6, a
higher riskfree rate of return r, a lower cost escalation rate 'Jr, and a
higher volatility 0-. The effect of extending the time to maturity T - t
is ambiguous. The direct effect of deferring T is positive, as is the case
with a financial European option. However, the opportunity cost of
having oil in the ground, caused by the rate of return shortfall 6 and
the cost escalation rate 'Jr, contributes negatively.i'
option. Third, we insert the relationship SBE(T) = exp{7r(T - t)}SBE(t).
The Black-Scholes call option pricing formula in the case where the underly-
ing asset pays a constant dividend rate is found, for instance, in Kemna (1987)
Eq. (6.3.4), McDonald and Siegel (1984), and Smith (1976). Some minor algebraic
manipulations then lead to Eqs. (5.1) - (5.3).
3The comparative statics of Wc are obtained in Appendix A.
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5.3 An abandonment option
Consider an undeveloped oil field, where the holder for some reason has
undertaken a commitment to initiate investments at the future date T.
Development will thus be started at date T, no matter what the spot
price appears to be at that date. This situation may be the result, for
instance, of an agreement between the holder and the Government.
Suppose it is possible for the holder to make an arrangement today,
so that the project may be abandoned without costs at the future date
T, if so desired.
The undeveloped oil reserve will be abandoned at the future date T
only if optimal. The future value of this arrangement is thus
Yp(S(T), T) = max{ -AS(T) + B(T), O}
The opportunity to abandon the project is similar to a European put
option. By rewriting the future pay-off Yp(S(T), T), and by using
previous results," we find that the current value of the opportunity to
abandon the project at the future date T is
Wp _ vt[max{ -AS(T) + B(T), O}]
_e-8(T-t) AS(t)N[-dl] + e-(r-7r)(T-t) B(t)N[-d2] (5.4)
where N[·] is the cumulative normal probability function, and where dl
and d2 are defined by Eqs. (5.2) and (5.3), respectively+
By combining Eq, (5.4) with Eqs. (4.5) and (5.1), we find that
C(S(t), T) +Wp = Wc (5.5)
4The future value of the abandonment option Yp(S(T), T) may alternatively be
written
max{ -AS(T) + B(T), O} = -AS(T) +B(T) +max{AS(T) - B(T), O}
The first two terms on the right hand side correspond to the future value of a
commitment to initiate immediately, whereas the last term represents the (negative)
future value of an accept/reject opportunity. The future value Yp(S(T), T) may
thus be evaluated by Eqs. (4.5) and (5.1). The symmetry of N(.] and some minor
algebraic manipulations lead to Eq. (5.4).
5With 6 = O, 7r = O,and A = 1, Eq. (5.4) corresponds to the standard European
put option, see, e.g., Ingersoll (1987) p. 320.
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This equation states that commitment to initiate investments at the
future date T, combined with the opportunity to abandon the project
costlessly at that date, is equivalent to the future accept/reject invest-
ment opportunity at the future date T. With h = O, 7r = O, and A = 1,
Eq. (5.5) boils down to the put-call parity for European options, see,
e.g., Ingersoll (1987) p. 304.
5.4 Immediate versus future decision
Now, suppose the holder of the undeveloped oil field is to choose ei-
ther an immediate accept/reject investment decision, or to defer the
accept/reject investment decision to the fixed future date T. This may
be the case, for instance, with Governmental regulations, or technolog-
ical constraints.
From our discussion in Section 5.2, we know that the current value
of a future accept/reject investment opportunity We is positive for all
S(t) > o. Rejecting the project immediately is thus inferior, and the
relevant decision alternatives today are thus either to initiate devel-
opment immediately, or to make the final investment decision at the
future date T.
The optimal decision depends on the current spot price S(t). The
critical spot price, with indifference between initiating immediately and
deferrring the investment decision to date T, is
SE(t) = {S(t): AS(t) - B(t) = Wc} (5.6)
where We is defined by Eqs. (5.1) - (5.3) above. In this case, im-
mediate initiation of the project is compared to an alternative with a
positive value, whereas in the accept/reject model, the alternative has
zero value. It is thus obvious that the critical price SE(t) exceeds the
accept/reject break even price SBE(t). Unfortunately, no closed form
solution of SE( t) is available, and its value must be approximated by
numerical methods for given parameter values.
The optimal decision in this case is
Defer the decision
Initiate immediately
if S(t) < SE(t)
if S(t) ~ SE(t) (5.7)
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and the current value of the undeveloped oil field is
V(S(t), t) = { ~~(t) _ B(t) if S(t) < SE(t)if S(t) ~ SE(t) (5.8)
given the optimal strategy.
We now illustrate this situation using our base case parameter values."
In addition, we assume that the time to the future decision date T is
T - t = 4 years.
The traditional accept/reject break-even price SBE is 8 USD/barrel
in this case." Figure 5.1 confirms that the value of the immediate ac-
cept/reject investment opportunity is linear in the current spot output
price, with a kink at S(t) = SBE.
The critical price, indicating indifference between initiating imme-
diately and deferring the final investment decision to the future date
T, is SE = 10.6 USD/barrel. We see from Figure 5.1 that the current
value of the future accept/reject opportunity is increasing and convex
in the spot output price S(t).
With S(t) = SBE, the current value of the future accept/reject
decision is 158 mill. USD. This represents the opportunity loss from
neglecting the flexibility to defer the final decision to date T. In Fig-
ure 5.1, we see that the opportunity 10ss8in the region SBE ~ S(t) ~ SE
is decreasing in S(t), and is zero with S(t) = SE'
5.5 Optimal timing of the decision date
In the optimal timing model considered in Chapter 4, the holder is
assumed to fix a future date at which the project is to be initiated.
This means that the project will be accepted at the future date T,
without respect to the future spot price S(T).
6Recall from Section 3.4 that 8 = 0.06, r = 0.05, 71' = O, (7'2 = 0.07, A = 130,
B = 1040.
7With our base case parameter values, we have 8 > r - 71'. This means that
"optimal timing" collapses into the accept/reject situation, see Chapter 4.
8The opportunity loss in the region SBE $ S(t) $ SE, caused by initiating im-
mediately rather than deferring the final decision to date T, is found by the vertical
difference between the broken curve and the upward sloping line in Figure 5.1.
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Now, suppose instead that the holder of the undeveloped oil field at
the current date t is to fix - once and for all- the future date T at which
the accept/reject investment decision is to be made. If the spot price of
oil S(T) at the future date T turns out to be lower than the break-even
price SBE(T), the project will be rejected. The problem stated here in
fact boils down to determining the optimal maturity date of the future
accept/reject investment opportunity We considered above.
In the Black-Scholes case of a European call option written on a
stock paying no dividends, the option value increases with the matu-
rity date. Deferring the future accept/reject decision date of the in-
vestment opportunity, however, causes an opportunity loss through the
rate of return shortfall on output as well as the escalating costs. From
Eq. (5.1), we see directly that with h > Oand r - 'Ti > O,We converges
to zero when T approaches infinity.
The current decision problem may be stated as
V(S(t), t) = max Wc(S(t), T)
T?_t
(5.9)
where the expression We is given by Eqs. (5.1) - (5.3). There exist no
closed-form solution to this problem.
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Figure 5.1
The value of the oil field
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Appendix A
Comparative statics
In this appendix, we consider the comparative statics of the value of the
future accept/reject investment opportunity, We. We may alternatively
write We, presented in Eqs. (5.1) - (5.3), as
We = e-li(T-t)A(b)f(S,K,k,O',T)
where the function f is the standard Black-Scholes call option pricing
formula
f(S, K, k, 0', T) = SN[dJ - e-k(T-t) K N[d - O'VT - tl
with
d = In(S/ K) + (k + ~0'2)(T - t)
- O'~
and where we interpret the two arguments Kand k as
K(~,,!,,) = SBE(t) = B(r)/A(El)
+
k( El r 7r) = r - 7r - El~'~,~
+
Kand k corresponds to the exercise price and the interest rate in the
standard option pricing formula.
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The partial derivatives of jare!
aj/as - N[d] > o
aj/aK _e-k(T-t) N[d - uv'T - tl < o
aj/ak - (T - t)e-k(T-t) K N[d - uv'T - tl > o
aj/au - v'T - tSn[d] > o
ke-k(T-t) K N[d - uv'T - tl + uS n[d]
2-1f'=t
Depends on k +
af/aT
see, e.g., Jarrow and Rudd (1983) Eqs. (9-5.a) - (9-5.e) or Smith (1976)
Eqs. (45) - (49).
By using the results above, we find the following partial derivatives
ofWe
aWe Ae-6(T-t) aj > o
as ~
+
aWe
a8
-(T _ t)W. -6(T-t) aA j -6(T-t)A (aj aK aj ak) < o
e + e a8 + e aK a8 + åk a8
.._"".,. ..........._............_. .._"".,..._"".,.
- - + +-
aWe = -6(T-t)A (aj aK aj ak) o
ar e s« ar + ak ar >..........._............_. .._"".,..._"".,.
- - + +
lThe partial derivatives may be obtained by using
Sn[d] = e-k(T-t) Kn[d - u..,jT - t]
where n[.] is the standard normal density function. This equation follows from the
definition of d and the standard normal density function.
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aWe e-'(T-tlA ( BJ Bk ) < O
a7r ak a7r
'-v-''-v-'
+ -
aWe e-c5(T-t)A aj > O
a(1 - a(1
'-v-'
+
aWe -8We + e-c5(T-t)A aj
aT aT
The sign of the partial derivative of aWe / aT is not determined. With
8 > O, the first term of the equation just above is clearly negative. The
sign of the second term, however, depends on the sign and the value of
etter.
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Chapter 6
INVESTMENT AT ANY
TIME
6.1 Introduction
In the traditional investment decision model presented in Chapter 4,
the owner is assumed to face an immediate choice between to accept
the project, to reject the project, or to fix - once and for all - the
future initiation date. With uncertainty present, however, deferring
the investment decision itself is superior to fixing the initiation date in
advance, as the future decision may take into account new information
received in the meantime.
We now apply the contingent claim framework to incorporate the
flexibility to defer the investment decision, by interpreting the undevel-
oped oil field as an American option. In the first section, we consider
the case where the investment decision in principle may be deferred
perpetually. An analytical solution to the field value and to the opti-
mal investment strategy is presented. In the second section, we proceed
to the case where the investment opportunity expires at a fixed future
date. Finally, we provide a numerical example using our base case
parameter values as input.
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6.2 The perpetual investment opportu-
nity
Assume that the investment decision may in principle be deferred per-
petually. If deferred, no cash outlays are incurred, but the present value
of the future costs B(t) grows exponentially at the rate n: The project
is irrevocable once undertaken.
6.2.1 The mathematical description
We interpret the investment opportunity as a contingent claim, with
the output spot price S as the only risk source. The value of the per-
petual investment opportunity, U(S, t), satisfies the partial differential
equation
(6.1)
where the subscripts indicate partial derivatives.!
We now turn to the boundary conditions. First, at any date t,
there exists a trigger price S*(t) indicating that immediate initiation
of development is optimal. When the current spot price equals this
trigger price, the value of the investment opportunity is equal to the
value of a commitment to initiate immediately. Formally,
U(S*(t), t) = AS*(t) - B(t) (6.2)
Second, given the optimal investment strategy, the "high contact"
or "smooth pasting" condition is met.P The condition states that when
the spot price equals the optimal trigger price, the sensitivity of the
option value, and the sensitivity of the intrinsic value, both with respect
to the spot price, are equal. In this case the condition translates into
Us(S*(t), t) = A (6.3)
Third, suppose that the current output spot price is zero. We then
know from Chapter 2 that the spot price will be zero in the economy
for all future dates as well. Initiating the project at date i' will then
1Eq. (6.1) is found hy inserting D = Oin Eq. (2.6).
2See Merton (1973), footnote 60.
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induce a loss B(t'). In this case, it will never be optimal to use the
investment opportunity, and we thus have
U(O, t) = O (6.4)
Eqs. (6.1) - (6.4) determine the value of the investment opportunity
U(S, t) and the optimal trigger price strategy S*(t).
The problem stated here corresponds to a perpetual American call
option written on a stock that pays a continuous proportional dividend,
see Samuelson (1965). McDonald and Siegel (1986) analyze a similar
option written on two stochastic assets. If exercised, the holder receives
the value of the first underlying asset by giving up the value of the latter.
6.2.2 The solution
The solution to our problem may be found by reinterpreting the pa-
rameters in one of the models of the two articles just mentioned. The
trigger price, indicating immediate investment, is
S*(t) = -13 13 SBE(t)
-1
(6.5)
where the parameter 13 > 1 is defined by Eq. (6.8) below. We see
that the trigger price at date t, S*(t), corresponds to the accept/reject
break-even price at that date, SBE(t), adjusted upwards with the factor
13/ (13 - 1) > 1. The optimal decision rule is thus
Defer if S(t) < S*(t)
Accept if S(t) ~ S*(t) (6.6)
and thus made conditional on the current spot price.
The value of the investment opportunity is
{
a(t)S(t)i3
U(S(t), t) = AS(t) _ B(t)
if S(t) < S* (t )
if S(t) ~ S*(t) (6.7)
where the parameters 13 > 1 and a > O are defined by Eqs. (6.8) and
(6.9), respectively. As we would expect, the value U(S, t) is positive,
and increasing in the current spot price of oil. If the current spot price
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equals or exceeds the trigger price, immediate investment is optimal,
and the value of the investment opportunity is identical to a commit-
ment to start development at once.
The exponent (3 is defined by
(3= (~ _ (r - 11') - 8) +
2 u2 (
(r-1I')-8 1)2 r-1I'...;...._~:---- - +2--
u2 2 u2 (6.8)
and the constant a is
a(t) == ( B(t) ) (S*(t)rø
(3-1 (6.9)
The condition of the rate of return shortfall 8 > O ensures that the
exponent (3> 1.3
With 8 ~ O, it is never be optimal to initiate investments before the
terminal date. 4 The perpetual investment opportunity will thus never
be used.f
In Appendix A, we show that the solution of U(S, t) satisfies the
general partial differential equation of a contingent claim, Eq. (6.1). It
is easy to verify that the three boundary conditions are met.
6.2.3 The flexibility factor ¢
The optimal investment strategy according to the contingent claim
model is stated in terms of a break-even decision rule. From Eq. (6.5),
we see that the trigger price S*(t) may be written as the accept/reject
break-even price SBE(t), adjusted upwards with a flexibility factor.
This factor <p, defined by
<p = S*(t)/ SBE(t) = -(3 (3
-1
(6.10)
3See Appendix B.
4It is well known from the financial literature that premature exercise of an
American call option written on a stock paying no dividends is non-optimal, see,
e.g., Ingersoll (1987) p. 305.
sThis is consistent with what we find in the optimal timing model, see footnote 2
in Chapter 4.
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indicates how much the accept/reject break-even price must be adjusted
because of the flexibility to make the investment decision at any time.
From Eq, (6.8) we see that time does not enter into the expression
of {3. We may thus conclude that the flexibility factor ¢> is independent
of t. In Appendix C, we show that we have
¢>= ¢>(~,~,~,~)
+ +
where the sign below each argument indicates the sign of the partial
derivative wrt. each argument, respectively.
We see that the flexibility factor ¢> depends on economy-wide pa-
rameters only: 8, r, n, and (f2. It does not depend on project specific
characteristics, such as the production schedule or the cost schedule.
6.3 The finite horizon investment oppor-
tunity
In many cases, the investment opportunity is not perpetual, but expires
at some future date if not used before this date. One example may be
that licence requires the oil company to return the oil field back to the
owner, say the Government, at some fixed future date if investments has
not been initiated before that date. Another example may be that the
oil reserve represents a sattelite field, where development is dependent
on a neighboring field being in production.
In this section, we consider the finite horizon investment opportu-
nity. First, we use our previous results to obtain bounds to the value
of the undeveloped oil field. Second, we describe the problem in terms
of the PDE with appropriate boundary conditions. Unfortunately, no
analytical solution to this problem is known. Several numerical meth-
ods are, however, available to approximate the value for a given set of
parameters."
Now, suppose that the investment decision may be deferred, but
that the investment opportunity expires at the fixed future date T'.
If the investment decision is deferred, no costs are incurred, but the
6For a survey of numerical methods, see Geske and Shastri (1985).
46 CHAPTER 6. INVESTMENT AT ANY TIME
present value of the future costs B(t) escalates at the exponential rate
7r. The project is irrevocable once undertaken.
6.3.1 Upper and lower bounds
It is possible for the holder of the finite investment opportunity to
undertake an immediate commitment to initiate at date T E [t, T'].
Alternatively, he may reject the project. Fixing such a strategy, how-
ever, is not optimal and we may thus conclude that the value of the
finite investment opportunity V(S(t), t) is bounded from below by
max { max C(S(t), T), o} :s; V(S(t), t)
Te[t,T')
where C(S(t), T) is defined by Eq. (4.5).
On the other hand, the future cash flow from the finite investment
opportunity may be replicated by acquiring a similar non-expiring in-
vestment opportunity, and by following a non-optimal strategy. The
value of the finite investment opportunity is thus bounded from above
by U(S(t), t).
Hence, we argue that the current value of the finite investment op-
portunity V(S(t), t) is bounded by
max { max C(S(t), T), o} s V(S(t), t) :s; U(S(t), t)
Te[t,T1
(6.11)
where C(S(t),T) and U(S(t),t) are given by Eq. (4.5) and Eq. (6.7),
respecti vely.
We note that the lower bound is non-negative. Furthermore, if the
current output price S(t) 2:: S*(t), defined by Eq. (6.5) above, we know
from Eq. (6.7) that the value of the perpetual investment opportunity
is equal to the value of initiating immediately. In this case, the lower
and the upper bound of V(S(t), t) coincide, and we thus have
V(S(t), t) = AS(t) - B(t) when S(t) 2:: S*(t)
This means that the trigger price in the finite case is bounded from
above by S*(t).
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6.3.2 The mathematical description
The value of the finite horizon investment opportunity V satisfies the
general partial differential equation of a contingent claim 7
(6.12)
We next turn to the boundary conditions.
First, if the investment has not been initiated before the expiration
date T', the holder faces an accept/reject decision situation at this
future date. The value of the investment opportunity at the future
date T' is thus
V(S(T'), T') = max {AS(T') - B(T'), O} (6.13)
Second, at each date t, there exists a trigger price SF( t), indicating
that immediate initiation is optimal. When the current spot output
price equals this trigger price, we have
V(SF(t), t) = ASF(t) - B(t) (6.14)
It can be seen from the first boundary condition, Eq. (6.13), that the
trigger price at the terminal date T' is
SF(T') = B(T')/ A = e(r-tr)(T'-t) SBE(t)
The trigger price at the expiration T date is identical to the break-even
price of an opportunity to make an accept/reject investment decision
at the future date T.
Third, from the previous section, we know from the boundary con-
ditions of the perpetual investment opportunity that U(O, t) = O. This
represents an upper bound to V(O, t). Moreover, we know that V in
general is non-negative. We may thus conclude that
V(O, t) = O (6.15)
Eqs. (6.12) - (6.15) define the value of the finite investment oppor-
tunity V(S, t) and the optimal trigger price function SF(t). The finite
7Note that Eqs. (6.12) and (6.1) are similar.
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investment opportunity is similar to an American call option with time
to maturity T' - t, written on a stock that pays a positive continuous
constant dividend rate.
There is no known analytical solution available in this case. The
value of this contingent claim may be approximated numerically for a
given set of parameter values. For a survey of numerical methods, see
Geske and Shastri (1985).
The binomial method may be phrased in a decision tree framework,
and represents the most intuitive approach, see, e.g., Ekern (1988).
Boyle (1977) develops a Monte Carlo simulation method for obtaining
the option value, whereas Brennan and Schwartz (1978) describes a
finite difference method. Barone-Adesi and Whaley (1987) presents a
solution algoritm for evaluating finite American call and put' options.
6.4 A numerical example
In this section, we provide a numerical example using our base case
parameter values." In addition, assume that the time to the expiration
of the finite horizon investment opportunity is T' - t = 4 years.
The results are shown in Figure 6.1. The kinked line, with value
zero when S ~ SBE, and sloping upwards in the region S ~ SBE,
represents the value of the oil reserve in the accept/reject situation, c.f.
Figure 5.1 in the previous chapter. Figure 6.1 in this chapter illustrates
that the value of the project, when taking into account the opportunity
of deferring the investment decision, is convex in the current spot price.
In the case of a non-expiring investment opportunity, we find that
the exponent in Eq. (6.8) is f3 = 2 and the constant in Eq. (6.9) is
o: = 4116, The flexibility factor is 4> = S*/SBE = 2. By recalling that
the accept/reject break-even price is SBE = 8 USD/barrel, we thus
have that the trigger price of the non-expiring investment opportunity
IS
S* = 16.0 USD/barrel
In the case where the investment opportunity expires in 4 years, the
8We recall from Section 3.4 that 8 = 0.06, r = 0.05, 7r = O, (>2 = 0.07, A = 130.
and B = 1040. The set of parameter values implies SBE = 8 USD/barrel.
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trigger price is9
SF = 14.1 USD/barrel
Both S* and SF exceed the traditional break-even price SBE by a large
fraction.
Consider the vertical difference between the upper curve and the
kinked line in Figure 6.1. This difference represents the opportunity loss
to the owner of a perpetual investment opportunity from managing the
project according to the traditional break-even price rule, developing
immediately if S 2:: SBE, and abandoning the oil reserve if S < SBE.
The opportunity loss is at its maximum when S = SBE, with U(SBE) =
260 mill. USD. Our example indicates that the opportunity loss can
be substantial when the flexibility to defer the investment decision is
ignored.
9We implement the explicit finite difference method to approximate the value
of the oil reserve and the trigger price. See Brennan and Schwartz (1978) for a
discussion of this method.
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Figure 6.1
The value of the oil field
1.1
1.2 ~-------------------------------------------------.
S~
Current spot output price (USDjbarrel)
0.8
c
o
0.7
co
0.6
<l)
::J
o
>
u
<l)
LL
0.5
0.4
0.3
-,-
'"-- '"'"'"'"'"0.1
O
7
SBE
119 13
S*
1715
- - - - Opportunity to invest at any time before fixed future date
(Finite American option)
------- Opportunity to invest at any time
(Perpetual American option)
Appendix A
U satisfies the PDE
In this appendix, we show that the value of the perpetual investment
opportunity when "alive", presented in Section 6.2, satisfies the gen-
eral partial differential equation of a contingent claim. We recall from
Eqs. (6.7), (6.9), and (6.5) that the function is given by
U(S, t) = a(t)SfJ when S(t) < S*(t)
where
a(t) = ( B(t) ) (S*(t))-fJ
13-1
S*(t) = 13 ~ 1SBE(t)
It can be verified that the partial derivatives of U(S, t) are
Us - j3US-1
Uss - 13(13 - I)US-2
Ut -7r(j3 - I)U
By inserting the partial derivatives above into the general partial
differential equation, given by ,
we obtain the equivalent expression
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The solution U = O is not of interest here. The first factor on the left
hand side represents a square expression in /3. It can be verified that
/3= (!_ (r-7r)-b) +
2 (72 (
(r-7r)-b 1)2 r-7r..:....._----:'---- - +2--
(72 2 (72
stated in Eq. (6.8), is a solution to Eq, (A.l). We may thus conclude
that the solution presented in Section 6.2 satisfies the general partial
differential equation of a contingent claim.
Appendix B
8 > O a sufficient condition
We now show the condition of the rate of return shortfall 8 > O is
sufficient to ensure that we have the exponent j3 > 1. We define for the
moment the two parameters
r-7r
a = --2-
a
and
b=(r-7r)-8
(j2
The condition 8 > O then translates into
a>b
Using the two parameters defined above, the exponent j3 may be written
j3 = (~ - b) + J (b - ~) 2 + 2a
The first term inside the square root is clearly positive. We now sub-
stitute a for b in the expression above. Recalling that a > b, we then
have
j3 > (~- b) + J (b - ~) 2 + 2b
with strict inequality. The terms inside the square root represents a
complete square expression in b. By rearranging, we obtain
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The right hand side of this inequality, representing a strict lower bound
to the exponent 13, equals one. We may thus conclude that a positive
"rate of return shortfall"
is a sufficient condition to ensure that the exponent 13 > 1.
Appendix C
Comparative statics of cp
The exponent f3 is a function of S, r, Jr, and (72. For notational conve-
nience, we define the parameter
and write the exponent f3
(
1 ( - b)f3= --- +2 (72
We recall from the previous appendix that the condition b > Oensures
f3>1.
Proposition 1 The sign of the partial derivative of f3 w. r. t. the "rate
of return shortfall" b is
Proof: The partial derivative in this case is
(C.l)
Knowing that f3 > 1, the proposition is easily verified. O
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Proposition 2 The signs of the partial derivative of (3wrt. the interest
rate r, and the cost escalation rate 'Jr, are
B(3 < O
Br
and
respectively.
Proof: The partial derivative of (3wrt. the parameter ( is
(C.2)
With (3> 1, we have
B(3
B( < O
The parameter is defined by ( = r - 'Jr, and the sign of the partial
derivative of (3with respect to the interest rate r, and the cost escalation
rate 'Jr, are thus
B(3 < O
Br
and
respectively. O
Proposition 3 The sign of the partial derivative of (3 wrt. the volatil-
ity (12 is
B(3
8((12) < O
Proof: In this case, we obtain the partial derivative
((-8)(3-(
(C.3)
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The sign of the partial derivative depends on the sign of the nominator.
We may alternativelyexpress the nominator n by
n = (( - b){3 - ( = ({3- 1)( - {3b
For convenience, the problem is divided into several regions, depending
on the relationship between the two parameters band (.
Region 1: « O < b ::::}n = ({3- 1) ( - {3b < O_______ ......,_, ......,_,
+ +
Region 2: (= O < b ::::}n = ({3- 1) ( - {3b < O_______ ......,_, ......,_,
+ o +
Region 3: O < ( < b ::::} n = (( - b) {3 - ( < O...._,_.......,_, ......,_,
+ +
Region 4: O < b = ( ::::}n = (( - b) {3 - ( < O...._,_.......,_, ......,_,
o + +
Region 5: O < s < (
We start with the condition of a positive "rate of return shortfall"
and subtract ( - b on each side
(>(-b
By multiplying through with the positive factor (28)2' and by simpli-
fying, we obtain
((~.)' > ((~.)
We now add the same expression on each side of the inequality
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The two last terms on the left hand side may alternatively be written
To obtain a complete square expression on the left hand side, we add
the same expression on each side
(_( )2+2(_( )(~_!)+(~_!)2( - 8 ( - 8 (12 2 (12 2
(() ((-8 1)2>2 - + ----(12 (12 2
The expression on the left hand side of the inequality is now a complete
square expression. Hence, we have
(_( + (~_ !))2 > 2 (i_) + (~_ !)2( - 8 (12 2 (12 (12 2
The right hand side is clearly positive. By taking the square root on
each side, and by some rearranging, we obtain
-( > (!_~) +
(- 8 2 (12
The expression on the right hand side is identical to our exponent f3,
and we thus have established that
(
(_8>f3
By rearranging the terms, we have the result
n = (( - 8)f3 - ( < O
In all regions, we have found that the nominator n is negative. We
may thus conclude that the partial derivative of the exponent f3 with
respect to the volatility (12is negative. That is,
8f38((12)< O
o
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Proposition 4 The comparative statics of the flexibility factor </> are
</>= </>CJ~,~,~,~)
+ +
where the sign below each argument indicates the sign of the partial
derivative.
Proof:
The flexibility factor </>is given by
(3
</>=(3-1
and the partial derivative of </>with respect to the exponent (3 is
8</>
8(3
1
((3-1)2 < O (C.4)
The partial derivative of the exponent (3, and the partial derivative of
the flexibility factor </>,with respect to the same argument, have oppo-
site signs. By using this property, and the results above, the proposition
is easily verified. O.
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Chapter 7
A PRODUCTION SWITCH
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we assumed the oil field, once developed, rep-
resents a commitment to extract oil according to a fixed preset schedule.
If the oil price drops sufficiently low, however, it may be desirable to
close down the production temporarily, or even to abandon the entire
project.
In this chapter, we take into account the opportunity to switch
the production on and off. Balancing realism and simplicity, we tilt
our explicit assumptions in favour of the latter, yielding a model with
tractable complexity.
The chapter is organized as follows: First, given some additional
assumptions, we reconsider the developed oil field in the case of no
production switch. Second, we introduce the production switch tech-
nology, and present the optimal production policy and the associated
field value.
The existence of a production switch flexibility will also affect the in-
vestment decision. Third, we analyze a perpetual investment opportu-
nity, where the oil field if developed will be equipped with a production
switch. Assuming no time lag between the development decision and
start-up of production, we determine the trigger price for investment
as well as the option value of the investment opportunity.
Finally, we use the base case parameter values to illustrate the ef-
fects of the production switch technology on the optimal strategy and
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the project value, and compare with our previous results. The numer-
ical example indicates that the error caused by ignoring the switching
flexibility is negligible when considering the investment decision.
7.2 The commitment value
In this section, we reconsider the commitment to produce oil according
to a fixed preset schedule, given some additional assumptions. Our
first additional assumption is that the instantaneous extraction of oil is
given and proportional to the remaining quantity of oil in the ground.'
This is equivalent to writing the production q(t) at date t during a short
time interval dt as
q(t)dt = ,Q(t)dt (7.1 )
where Q(t) represents the total quantity of oil in the ground at that
date, and the parameter, > O is the given extraction rate. With no
flexibility to switch on and off the production, the remaining quantity
of oil Q in the field at the future date t' is deterministic, and given by
the function
Q(t') = e--y(t'-t)Q(t) (7.2)
We see that Q is an exponentially declining function of calendar time.
The second additional assumption is that the project is perpetual.
At first sight, this may seem like a restrictive assumption. With a
reasonable high rate " however, the resource will be extracted quite
rapidly, and the model outlined in this chapter may thus serve as a
fairly good approximation.
The third additional assumption is that the unit variable cost of pro-
duction, c, is independent of both time and production. Furthermore,
there are no fixed production costs.
From Chapter 3, we know that the current value of the commitment
to extract oil is linear in the current spot output price S(t). With
lPaddock, Siegel, and Smith (1988) notes that this is a standard assumption in
the literature on petroleum extraction and reflects geological constraints on extrac-
tion.
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) considers switching flexibility in the case of a copper
mine. In their specific model, the authors assume that the produced quantity (if
any) per time unit is constant, and that the total quantity of copper is infinite.
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our additional assumptions, it is easy to verify that the value of the
developed oil field is
C(S(t), t) = AS(t) - Bp (7.3)
where the time-adjusted quantity of oil A is
i
A= D+iQ(t) (7.4)
and where the present value of the future variable production costs Bp
IS
B = _i_cQ(t)
p r+i (7.5)
Now, consider a hypothetical accept/reject decision situation, with
an immediate choice between undertaking a commitment to produce
according to the fixed preset schedule and to abandon the field cost-
lessly. From Eqs. (7.3) - (7.5), we obtain that the break-even price, Sp,
indicating indifference between the two alternatives, is
(7.6)
We note that Sp differs from the unit cost of production c whenever
D"I= r.
7.3 The developed oil field
7.3.1 Assumptions
Suppose the developed oil field considered in Section 7.2 is equipped
with a production switch technology, so that the production may be
costlessly switched on and off at any date. Furthermore, assume that
the project in principle is perpetual.
If the field is in production, the extraction rate i and the unit cost
c are both constant and given (see above). If the oil field is tempo-
rary shut down, no costs are incurred.I and that the total extractable
quantity Q(t) remains constant.:'
2It is easy to take into account fixed costs that are determined by calendar time
only, and that are independent of whether the field is producing or not.
3We do not consider the switching flexibility as a mean to increase the total
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7.3.2 The partial differential equation
With the flexibility to switch on and off the production, the developed
oil field represents a right, but no obligation, to extract oil. We inter-
pret the field as a contingent claim, with the output spot price as the
only source of uncertainty. The value of the developed oil field H(S, t)
satisifes the general partial differential equation"
where D represents "cash dividends" to the holder of the contingent
claim.
If the oil reserve is not producing, the project is not generating
cash, and we have D = O. Furter, with no time horizon, the partial
derivative of the field value V wrt. calendar time is zero. The value of
the non-producing oil field V thus satisfies the PDE
(7.8)
If the oil field is producing, the extraction is proportional to the re-
maining quantity of oil in the ground. With a constant unit production
cost, c, the instantaneous net cash revenue from operations at date t is
D(S(t), t)dt = ,Q(t) (S(t) - c) dt (7.9)
Eq. (7.9) may be interpreted as the cash dividends received by the
holder of the contingent claim.
As there is no time horizon related to this problem, the only way
the calendar time affects the value of the producing oil field is through
the decline in the future extractable quantity of oil. Our assumption
of a constant exponential extraction rate, Eq. (7.2), then implies that
the partial derivative of the field value U wrt. calendar time t is
U = 8U(S, Q) 8Q(t) = _ Q(t)~
t 8Q m ' Q (7.10)
where UQ is the partial derivative of the field value wrt. the total re-
maining quantity of oil Q.
extractable quantity of oil, but merely focus on the output price uncertainty.
4See the discussion in Chapter 2.
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By inserting the expressions of the "net cash revenue" and the time
derivative, Eqs, (7.9) and (7.10), into the general partial differential
equation, Eq, (7.7) above, we have that the value of the producing oil
field U satisfies the PDE
(7.11 )
This equation may alternatively be found by inserting our assumptions
into Eq, (15) of Brennan and Schwartz (1985).
To obtain the particular solution to our problem, boundary condi-
tions need to be specified. This is the topic to which we now turn.
7.3.3 The boundary conditions
If the spot price of oil approaches infinity, the probability that the
production will be switched off within, say ten years, is almost zero.
This means that the developed oil field is more or less equivalent to a
commitment to produce according to the fixed profile. By using the
results from the Section 7.2, our first boundary condition reads
lim U(S) = AS - Bps.....OO (7.12)
On the other hand, if the spot price of oil approaches zero, it is unlikely
that the production will be switched on in the near future. In this case,
the oil field is similar to an abandoned one. The value of the production
opportunity will then be close to zero, and we thus have the limit
lim V(S) = Os.....o (7.13)
Somewhere in between these two extreme cases, there exists a crit-
ical spot price of oil, for which the holder of the oil field is indifferent
between currently producing and not. We then have
(7.14)
where S; is the critical price indicating indifference.
With investors maximizing value, the critical price, representing a
decision variable, is chosen to maximize the value of the oil reserve.
This leads to the maximization problem
H(S) = G(S,S;) = m:xG(S,x) = { ~~~::~ when S ~ xwhen S ~ x
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where the function H(S) is the value of the oil field given the optimal
choice of the critical price x = S;.5 The maximization problem, and
the optimality conditions presented below, are discussed in more detail
in Appendix A.
The first optimality condition of the maximization problem above
states that the critical price x is to be chosen so that the partial deriva-
tive of the function G wrt. this argument is zero. That is,
G (S S*) = { Vx(S, S;) = O
x , p Ux(S,S;) = O
when s:::; x
when S ~ x (7.15)
With the decision variable x being independent of the spot price of the
underlying asset, the optimal critical price S;, is independent of the
current spot price S as well.
Suppose the optimal critical price is chosen, x = S;, and the spot
price of oil equals this critical price, S = S;. Then, the second opti-
mality condition states that the value of the field if not producing, and
the value of the field if producing, have equal sensitivity wrt. the spot
price of oil, S. Formally,
(7.16)
This is known as the "high contact" condition, see Samuelson (1965)
and Merton (1973).
From Eq. (7.14) and Eq. (7.16), we see that at the boundary S = S;,
both the value of the developed oil field, and the risk exposure of the
field value wrt. spot price uncertainty, are independent of whether the
oil field is currently producing or not. In that case, U and V thus are
"identical" assets, with equal value and equal risk.
7.3.4 The optimal switching strategy and field
value
The partial differential equations, Eqs. (7.8) and (7.11), together with
the boundary conditions, Eqs. (7.12) - (7.16), represent a mathematical
5Both functions U(S, x) and V(S, x) are by assumption continuous and twice
differentiable wrt. the two arguments. They are concave wrt. x. The decision
variable x is independent of the price S.
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description of the value of the developed oil field. This system has
an analytical solution, obtained in Appendix B. We now present and
comment the solution.
The critical spot price of oil S;, indicating indifference between
producing and not producing, is given by
(7.17)
The optimal switching policy thus consists of a comparision between
current spot price of oil, S, and the critical price, S;. We have the
following "if - then" -switching strategy:
Do not produce if
Produce if
S < S*- p
S> S*- p
(7.18)
If it is optimal to produce (S 2: S;), the value of the developed oil
field U is
(7.19)
where 0:7 and 134 are defined below. We recognize the two last terms as
the value of the corresponding commitment produce according to the
fixed preset schedule. The first term in this equation then represents
the value of the flexibility to switch on and off the production in the
future as the spot price of oil changes. If the current spot price is just
above the critical price, the probability that the option to switch off will
be used within, say 2 years, is higher than if the current spot price is
high. We thus expect the pure option value to be a decreasing function
of current spot price, which indeed is the case.
If it is optimal not to produce (S ~ S;), the value of the developed
oil field V is
(7.20)
where 0:1 and 131 are defined below. The value of the oil field when not
producing, V, reflects the value of the flexibility, at any future date, to
turn the non-producing oil field into a producing one that is equipped
with a production switch. The probability that this "swithing on"-
option will be used is higher the closer the current price of oil is to the
critical price S;. Hence, V is an increasing function of current spot
pnce.
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The exponents contained in the equations above, are defined by
(
1 r - b)/31 = - - -- +2 (72 ( )
2
r - b 1 r---- +2-
(72 2 (72 (7.21)
(
r - b _ ~) 2 + 2 r + ,
(72 2 (72
By comparing Eq. (7.21) and Eq. (6.8), we see that with the parameter
11" = O in Eq. (6.8), the two exponents /3 and /31 are identical. With our
restrictions on the parameter values, we have /31 > 1 and /34 < 0.6 The
constants are defined by
(7.22)
(7.23)
/31Bp
a1= -:-(/3:--4 ---1 :--:)(/3-:-4--"':""/3-=-1-:-':)(- -S.--:-)Ø-=-4
. P
(7.24)
and are both positive.
7.4 The investment opportunity
In this section, we proceed to an investment opportunity, where the oil
reserve, if developed, will be equipped with a production switch tech-
nology as discussed above. We assume that the investment opportunity
is perpetual, and that the development of the oil field is instantaneous."
If the investment decision is deferred, the present value of the future
investment costs Bi is constant." There are no costs associated with
holding this non-developed oil field.
6We recall from Appendix B in Chapter 6 that 6 > Oimplies ø> 1. This result
includes the special case of 7r = O. Furthermore, we noted just above that ø = Øl
when 7r = O. By combining the results, we thus have Øl > 1.
We assume both r> Oand 'Y > O, see Section 2.2 and Section 7.2. It is easy to
show that r + 'Y > Oimplies Ø4 < O.
1In Chapter 8, we consider a similar investment problem where there is a fixed
time lag between the initiation date of the project and the first date of production.
8The cost escalation rate 7r is thus zero.
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We interpret the undeveloped oil reserve as a contingent claim.
With no cash "dividends" , constant exercise price, and no time horizon,
the value of this asset W satisfies the partial differential equation .
(7.25)
We next turn to the boundary conditions.
The probability that the oil field will be developed within, say ten
years, decreases with the spot price of oil. The value of the investment
opportunity will then converge towards zero, and we thus have the limit
lim W(S) = Os.....o (7.26)
By comparing Eqs. (7.25) and (7.26), with Eqs. (7.8) and (7.13), we
see that the partial differential equation and the "low price" boundary
condition of the investment opportunity are identical to the correspond-
ing conditions of the developed non-producing oil field. If we for the
moment assume that there are no investment costs, the investment
opportunity and the developed non-producing oil field are in fact iden-
tical assets. In that case, the critical price Si, indicating immediate
"investment" , is identical to the switching price S;.
From this hypothetical discussion, it is obvious that the presence
of investment costs implies that the critical investment price, Si, ex-
ceeds the critical switching price, S;. If the current spot price of oil
indicates immediate investment, it will also be optimal to switch on
the production on the immediately developed oil field." To obtain the
critical investment price Si, we must thus compare the value of the
investment opportunity W with the value of the corresponding produc-
ing developed oil field U. At the trigger price Si, indicating immediate
investment, we thus have
W(Si) = U(Si) - Bi (7.27)
In this case, the "high contact" condition reads
Ws(Si) = Us(Si) (7.28)
9Recall from the assumptions stated in the beginning of this section that devel-
opment is instantaneous.
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The partial differential equation, Eq. (7.25), and the three boundary
conditions, Eqs. (7.26) - (7.28), define the value of the investment op-
portunity and the corresponding trigger price. The system is solved in
Appendix C. Here we present the results.
Unfortunately, there is no closed form solution to the value of the
trigger price, Si, indicating that immediate investment is optimal. Ap-
pendix C.2 demonstrates that the the critical price Si is unique. Ap-
pendix C.l shows that it is defined implicitly by the equation
(7.29)
The value of Si is found for given parameter values by using an iterative
procedure.
In Appendix C.3, we show that the trigger price Si, indicating that
immediate investment is optimal, is bounded by
(1 + Bi) S· < S~ < S· .BP'p
where S; and S· are defined by Eqs. (7.17) and (6.5), respectively. By
knowing the project parameters A, Bp, and Bi, and the exponents /31
and /34, we may thus obtain bounds to Si.
The lower bound may be interpreted as the trigger price of an un-
developed oil field similar to the one considered, except that the invest-
ment cost is zero, and that the unit production cost is ((Bi + Bp) / Bp)c
rather than c. The trigger price indicating "investment" then coincides
with the critical price indicating that producing is optimal. The up-
per bound corresponds to the trigger price of the project considered
without the flexibility to switch on and off.
The value of the investment opportunity W islO
(7.30)
where the exponent /31 is given by Eq. (7.21) above, and where the
positive'? constant as is defined by
(7.31 )
lOSeeAppendix C.l.
llSee Appendix CA.
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We have already noted that the PDE and the "low price" condition of
the investment opportunity and the developed non-producing oil field
are indentical. It is no surprise, then, that the two formulas, Eqs. (7.20)
and (7.30), expressing the value of the two assets, are similar but with
different constants.
In Appendix C.5, we analyze the partial derivative of S; wrt. the in-
vestment costs Bi, conditional on the total costs Bi +Bp being constant.
We find that
dS; I > Ose. B;+Bp=B
From the definition of the traditional accept/reject break-even price
SBE as (Bi + Bp)/ A, it is easy to see that
(7.32)
(7.33)
Now, consider two projects that are identical, except for the distribution
of the total costs B into investment costs Bi and production costs Bp.
From Eqs. (7.32) and (7.33), we may conclude that even though the
two projects have equal break-even prices SBE, the trigger price S; of
the one with the highest ratio (Bd Bp) will exceed the trigger price of
the other. In Appendix C.5 it is shown that this translates into the
field with the highest ratio having the lowest value. All others equal,
we thus prefer a project where the investment costs Bi counts for a
small fraction of total costs B.
We may interpret the ratio Bi] Bp as being inversely related to the
degree of the total investment and operating flexibility of the undevel-
oped oil field. A higher ratio (Bd Bp) thus means a lower degree of
flexibility, and, all others equal, a lower field value.
7.5 A numerical example
In this section, we provide a numerical example using our base case
parameter values.12 Furthermore, suppose that
12Werecall from Section 3.4 that 6 = 0.06, r = 0.05, 7r = O, (1'2 = 0.07, A = 130,
and B = 1040.
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Extractable quantity Q
Investment costs Bi
Extraction rate i
Unit production cost c
190 Mill. barrels
669.5 Mill. USD
0.13
2.7 USD/barrel
By inserting the numerical values of i, 8, r, c, and Q into Eqs. (7.4)
and (7.5), we find
Time-adjusted quantity A
Production costs Bp
130 Mill. barrels
370.5 Mill. USD
The total costs are then B = Bi + Bp = 1040 mill. USD.
Now, consider the developed oil field. The break-even price, indi-
cating indifference between to abandon the project' once and for all,
and to undertake a commitment never to switch off the production, is
Sp = Bpi A = 2.85 USD Ibarrel.
The value of the two exponents in Eqs. (7.21) and (7.22) are 131 = 2
and 134 = -1%. By inserting the numerical values of 131,134, Bp, and A,
into Eq. (7.17), we obtain that the trigger price, indicating switching
on and off production, is S; = 3.6 USD Ibarrel. S; thus exceeds the
unit production cost c.
Table 7.1 shows the value of the developed oil field. The first column
contains the current spot price. The next column shows the value of
a commitment to extract oil according the fixed preset schedule, see
Section 7.2. In this case, the project value is a linear function of the
current spot price. .
The last column represents the value of the developed oil field with
the flexibility to switch production on and off, c.f. Section 7.3. We see
that the value of the project is convex in S. With the current spot price
close to zero, the field value is also close to zero. In this case, we expect
that it will be a long time before switching on production is optimal,
and the project is thus similar to an abandoned one. If the current spot
price is high, we see from Table 7.1 that the value of the opportunity to
extract oil converges to the value of a pure commitment. In this case,
the field is expected to be producing for a long time before it will be
optimal to switch off production for the first time.
Table 7.2 shows the value of the undeveloped oil field as a func-
tion of the current spot output price. The first column represents the
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accept/reject investment decision situation, see Section 4.2. The break-
even price is SBE == B / A = 8 USD /barrel.
In the next column, we find the value of a non-expiring investment
opportunity, where the oil field, if developed, corresponds to a pure
commitment to extract oil, discussed in Section 6.2. We recall from
the numerical example of Chapter 6 that the trigger price, indicating
immediate development, is S* = 16.0 USD /barrel.
The final column of Table 7.2 contains the value of a non-expiring
investment opportunity in the case where the oil field, if developed, will
be equipped with a production switch technology. The trigger price,
defined by Eq. (7.29), is Si = 15.8 USD/barrel.
By comparing the project values of the two last columns in Table 7.2,
we may conclude that the additional value of the switching flexibility is
negligible. Furthermore, the difference between the two trigger prices,
S* and Si, is marginal. Our numerical results indicate that when an-
alyzing a project with both investment and switching flexibility, and
where the investment cost is large relative to production cost, the most
important decision flexibility to model is the one related to the invest-
ment decision.
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Table 7.1: The value of the developed oil field
Current Commitment Production
spot price to produce switch
(USD) (Mill. USD) (Mill. USD)
1 - 240 13
2 - 110 53
3 20 119
4 150 211
5 280 321
6 410 440
7 540 563
8 670 688
9 800 815
10 930 942
11 1060 1070
12 1190 1199
13 1320 1328
14 1450 1457
15 1580 1586
16 1710 1715
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Table 7.2: The value of the undeveloped oil field
Current Traditional Investment Both investment
output accept flexibility and switching
spot price reject only flexibility
(USD) (Mill. USD) (Mill. USD) (Mill. USD)
1 O 4 4
2 O 16 16
3 O 37 37
4 O 65 65
5 O 102 102
6 O 146 147
7 O 199 200
8 O 260 261
9 130 329 331
10 260 406 409
11 390 492 494
12 520 585 588
13 650 687 690
14 780 796 801
15 910 914 919
16 1040 1040 1046
17 1170 1170 1175
18 1300 1300 1305
19 1430 1430 1434
20 1560 1560 1564
21 1690 1690 1694
22 1820 1820 1823
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Appendix A
The optimality conditions
G(S,S;) = m:xG(S,x) = { ~~~::jwhen S.:::; xwhen S ~ x
Consider the following maximization problem
where the functions U and V are assumed to be continuous, twice dif-
ferentiable wrt. both arguments, and concave in their second argument
x. The decision variable x is independent of S.
We rewrite the problem above as a constrained maximization prob-
lem. Formally, we have the equivalent problem
G(S,S;) = maxG(s,x) subject to s = S
s.a:
The corresponding Lagrange-function L( s, x) is
maxL(s,x) = { max.; V(s,x) - A(S - S)
s.» max.; U(s, x) - A(S - S)
when s :::;x
when s 2: x
The partial derivatives of the Lagrange function L( s, x) wrt. the two
arguments s and x, evaluated in the point (s = S, x = S;), are
8L(S, S;) = V,(S, S*) _ A = O
8s p (A.l)
8L(S, S;) = Vx(S, S*) = O
8x p (A.2)
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in the region s ~ x. And in the region s ~ x, we have
åL(S, S;) = Us(S,S*) _ A = O
ås p (A.3)
åL(S, S;) = Ux(S, S*) = O
åx p (AA)
We now evaluate Eq. (A.l) and Eq. (A.3) at the boundary s = S =
S;. By equating the two left hand sides, and cancelling the shadow
price A, we obtain
(A.5)
This equation states that in the point (s = S;, x = S;), the two func-
tions have equal sensitivity wrt. S. This is known as the "high contact"
condition.'
The two remaining equations state that the optimal choice of the
decision variable, x = S;, is the one at which the partial derivative of
the function (U or V) wrt. x is zero. That is,
G (S S*) _ { Vx(S, S;) = O
x , p - U (S S*) = Ox , p
when S ~ S;
when S ~ S; (A.6)
We recall that the decision variable x is independent of S. The optimal
value of the decision variable S;, obtained by evaluating Eq. (A.6) in
S = S, is thus valid for all values of S.
lSee Samuelson (1965) and Merton (1973), footnote 60.
Appendix B
The developed oil field
B.l The non-producing oil field
First, we consider the developed non-producing oil field. Its value V
must satisfy the partial differential equation given by Eq, (7.8). The
general solution to Eq. (7.8) is
where we define the exponents
(
1 r - h)/31 = - - -- +2 (j2 ( )
2r - h 1 r---- +2-
(j2 2 (j2 (B.1)
and
( )
2r - h 1 r---- +2-
(j2 2 (j2
With h > O and r > O, the two exponents have opposite signs, with
/31 > 1 and /32 < o. To meet the "low price" boundary condition in
Eq. (7.13), stating that the value of the developed non-producing oil
field converges towards zero as the spot price of oil approaches zero, we
must have the constant, associated with the negative exponent, is
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The constant 02 = O implies that the value of the developed non-
producing oil field V(S) is given by the following power function of
S
(B.2)
where /31 is determined by Eq, (B.1), and where the constant Ol is
obtained below.
B.2 The producing oil field
The PDE in Eq. (7.11), that the value of the producing oil field U
must satisfy, is somewhat more tricky to solve. However, with our
assumed constant exponential extraction rate, it is possible to obtain
an analytical solution.
The relation between the value of the producing oil field, U, and
the value of one barrel of oil "in the ground" in the same field, u, is
U(S, Q) = u(S)Q (B.3)
We thus have the following relationship between the partial derivatives
Us = Qus
Uss = Quss
UQ = u
(BA)
(B.5)
(B.6)
By inserting Eqs. (B.3) - (B.6) above into the PDE in Eq. (7.11), can-
celling Q, and rearranging, we obtain that the equivalent condition,
stated in terms of the value of one unit of oil in the ground u, is
!a2S2uss + (r - 8)Sus - (r + ,)u + ,(S - c) = O (B.7)
see, e.g., Eq, (37) in Brennan and Schwartz (1985).
The general solution of this PDE is
u(S) = 03Sf33+ 04Sf34+ osS + 06 (B.8)
where the two exponents /33 and /34 are given by
(1 r - 8)/33= ---- +2 a2
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(
r - 8 _ ~) 2 + 2 r + I'
(72 2 (72 (B.9)
With 8 > O, r > O, and l' > O, we have /33 > 1 and /34 < O.
The boundary condition related to "high oil price", Eq, (7.12),
translated into the value of one unit of oil "in the ground" , reads
lim u( S) = A S _ Bp
S-+oo Q Q
With the positive sign of the exponent /33, it is necessarry to have the
associated constant
a3 = °
to meet this condition. From comparing the two last terms of Eq. (B.8)
with the limit stated just above, we see that the two remaining con-
stants as and a6 are
as = AIQ
and
a6 = -BpIQ
We now insert the expressions of the constants a3, as, and a6 into
the general solution of the value of one unit of oil in the ground u,
Eq. (B.8). By multiplying through that expression with the total quan-
tity of oil Q, we have that the value of the producing oil field U is given
by
U(S) = a7S{34+ AS - B;
where we have defined the new constant a7 as
a7 = a4Q
The exponent /34 is defined by Eq. (B.g) above, and the constant a7
remains to be determined below.
(B.lO)
B.3 The critical price Si
So far, we have found that the functional form of the asset value, con-
tingent on that the optimal critical price x = S; is chosen, is
* {V(S, S;) = a1S{31 when S ~ S;
G(S, Sp) = U(S, S;) = a7S{34+ AS - Bp when S 2:: S;
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where constants /3l, /34, A, and Bp are determined above. In this sub-
section, by using the remaining boundary conditions in Subsection 7.3.3
above, the optimal critical price S;, and 01 and 07 are found.
The partial derivative of the asset value wrt. the price of the un-
derlying asset S, is in this case
when S ~ S;
when S?: S; (B.11 )
Provided that the critical price is chosen optimally, x = S;, and
that the price of the underlying asset equals this critical price, S = S;,
we know from Eq. (7.14) that the oil field has the same value whether
producing or not producing. In this case, we thus have the condition
(B.12)
Furthermore, at this point, the "high contact" condition, Eq. (7.16),
stating that the value of the oil field if producing and the value of the
oil field if not producing have equal sensitivities wrt. S, is also met.
From Eq. (B.11), we see that the condition in this case translates into
(B.13)
Eqs. (B.12) and (B.13) imply that the 01 and 07 are given by
(B.14)
and
(/31 - 1)AS; - /3IBp
07 = (/34 - /3t)(S;){34
We see that both 01 and 07 depends on the value of the optimal critical
price S;.
The remaining optimality condition, Eq. (7.15), states that the par-
tial derivative of the asset value wrt. the decision variable x, evaluated
in the point (S, x = S;), is zero. Formally, we have
(B.15)
Gx(S,x = S;) = O (B.16)
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We recall that the decision variable x is independent of S. It is thus
sufficient to evaluate this condition with S fixed at an arbitrary chosen
value.
Now, consider Eq. (B.16), where we fix S = S;, and choose to
focus on the non-producing oil field.! As S and x are independent, the
remaining optimality condition, Eq. (B.16), is equivalent to
8al(S;, S;) = O
8x
(B.17)
in this case.
From Eq. (B.14), we see that al is expressed in terms of the critical
price S;. The derivative of al along the boundary S = x, evaluated in
the point (S = S;, x = S;), may be written as
dal(S = S;,x = S;)I 8al(S;,S;) 8al(S;,S;)= +-~,,___.:....;_
dS; S=x 8S ax
(B.18)
However, al is independent of S, and the first term on the right hand
side in Eq. (B.18) is zero. Moreover, according to the optimality con-
dition, Eq. (B.17), the second term in Eq. (B.18) is zero as well. The
optimal critical price S; is thus determined by the condition
8al = O
8S;
By obtaining the partial derivative on the left hand side of the equation
just above, and by solving the equation with respect to S;, we find
that the optimal trigger price, indicating indifference between currently
producing and not, S;, is given by
S* = (31(34 e,
p ((31 - 1)((34 - 1) A
as reported as Eq. (7.17) in the text. By inserting the solution of the
trigger price into al and a7, we obtain the simplified expressions
(B.19)
(B.20)
lWith the producing oil field as the starting point of the analysis, we will arrive
at the identical result by proceeding as below.
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(B.21 )
Appendix C
The investment opportunity
C.l The solution
We noted in Section 7.4 that the undeveloped oil field and the developed
non-producing oil field have identical partial differential equations and
"low price" conditions. From our discussion in Appendix B.l, it should
then be obvious that the value of the non-developed oil field is given
by a similar function described by
where exponent /31 is defined above in Eq. (7.21).
The constant 08 and the critical oil price Si are determined by the
two remaining boundary conditions in Eqs. (7.27) and (7.28). We insert
the expressions of Wand U, and their corresponding partial derivatives,
into the two boundary conditions, respectively, and yield
08' (Snø1 - 07' (Si)ø4 + AS; - (Bi + Bp) (C.l)
08/31' (Snfh-1 = 07/34' (S;)ø4-1 + A (C.2)
where we denote the trigger price indicating immediate investment by
S;. By multiplying through Eq. (C.l) with /34, and through Eq. (C.2)
with -Si, and adding the left hand sides and the right hand sides, we
have
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We solve this equation with respect to the constant 08, and obtain
(C.3)
By inserting the constant 08 into the first boundary condition,
Eq. (C.l), and rearranging, we have that the trigger price Si is de-
fined by the equation
There is no closed form expression of this critical price.
C.2 The critical price Si is unique
In the hypothetical case without investment costs, the undeveloped and
the developed non-producing oil field are identical assets. Thus, with
investment costs present, the trigger price Si, indicating immediate
investment, strictly exceeds the "switching price" S;. This is equivalent
to stating that the ratio
s'!
Ai = S~> 1
p
By inserting the definition of 07, Eq. (7.24), into Eq. (CA), and some
rearranging, we find that the condition determining the trigger price
Si equivalently may be written
(34
1_1 (SSl
p
**") {J4 (3 (S*) ( B )(34 ~ 1 S~ + 1 + B: = O
The condition just above may alternatively be stated in terms of the
function
H(A) = 1 A{J4 _ (34 A + (1 + Bi) (C.5)
(34 - 1 (34 - 1 B;
where A > 1, and where the trigger price Si = AiS; is given by
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We see from Eq. (C.5) that H()") is continuous wrt. ).,. The partial
derivative of H()") wrt. )., is
(C.6)
and H()") is thus a decreasing function of ).,. Furthermore, it is easy to
verify that we have the two limits
lim H()")
>'-1
lim H()") -
>'-00
To sum up, we have found that H().,) is a continuous and decreas-
ing function of )., in the region X > 1. Its value is positive when the
argument is "small", and negative when the argument is "large". We
may thus conclude that ).,7, defined by
H().,i) = O
IS umque. Concequently, we have established that the trigger price
Si = ).,7S; is unique.
C.3 A lower and an upper bound to Si
Suppose for the moment that the trigger price is
This corresponds to the ratio
By inserting ).,L into Eq. (C.5), and rearranging, we obtain
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With positive investment costs Bi, the expression inside the curly brack-
ets exceeds one. Recalling that the exponent /34 is negative, the expres-
sion outside the curly bracets is negative. We thus have that
The function H().) is decreasing in )., and ).L thus represents a lower
bound to the "true" ratio, ).7. From this discussion we may conclude
that
SL = (1 + !;) S; < S;
Now, suppose instead that the trigger price is
(C.7)
Su = S·
This translates into the ratio
By inserting the expression of ).U into the function H().), given by
Eq. (C.5) above, and rearranging, we have
It is easy to see that
H().u) <O
and we conclude that
S; < S· = Su (C.8)
Collecting our results, stated in Eqs. (C.7) and (C.8), we have found
that the trigger price S; is bounded by
(1 + Bi) S· < S'! < S·BP'p (C.g)
where S; and S· are given by Eqs. (7.17) and (6.5), respectively.
C.4. THE CONSTANT 08 IS POSITIVE S9
C.4 The constant as is positive
By Eq. (7.31) above, the constant 08 is given as
Some manipulations lead to the equivalent expression
The factor outside the curly brackets is positive. As /31 > 1, we have
O < /31 - 1 < 1
/31
Furthermore,
S· > (1 + Bi) S·
t B p
p
see Eq. (C.9). Thus, the expression inside the curly brackets is positive,
and we have established that 08 > O.
C.5 The effect of a change in cost mix
In this subsection, we consider the concequence on the trigger price St,
and on the value of the undeveloped oil field W, of a change in the
investment costs Bi, conditional on the total costs B being constant.
Formally, we will find
This expression is equivalent to
(C.10)
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From Eq, (7.17), we easily find the partial derivatives
os:
_p =0ne,
os: S·
_p = _E_ee, s,
(C.lI)
(C.12)
The ratio Ai is determined by H(Ai) = Owhere the function is given
in Eq. (C.5) above. By using this relationship, we obtain
o» åH(Xi)/åBi 1 1 (C.13),es. åH(Ai)/åA s, åH(At)/åA
åA"! åH(Ai)/åBp Bi 1 (C.14), - ---es, åH(Ai)/åA (Bp)2 åH(At)/ åA
By inserting Eqs. (C.Il) - (C.14) into Eq. (C.lO), some rearranging
yields
dS; I S; {B B B A. åH(At)}
dBi Bi+Bp=B = - (Bp)2(åH(Ai)/åA) p + i + p i åA
(C.15)
As åH/åA < O, see Eq. (C.6), the expression outside the curly brackets
is positive. Now, consider for the moment the expression inside the
curly brackets of Eq, (C.15), here denoted by C. By inserting the ex-
pression of the partial derivative åH(Ai)/åA, found in Eq. (C.6), into
the last term of C, we have
(C.16)
The definition of Ai, H(Ai) = O, implies that
(C.17)
By inserting Eq. (C.17) into Eq. (C.16), and simplifying, we find that
the expression inside the curly brackets, C, is equivalent to
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We may thus conclude that
ss:, (>.;)13.S;
(aH(>'i)/a>')Bp > O
Next, consider the effect on the value of the undeveloped oil field,
W, when the cost structure changes as above. The field value W is
described by Eqs. (7.30), (7.31), and (7.21). We note that the change
in cost structure only affects as through the trigger price S;, and we
thus have
dW I = SØl aas (dS; I )
dBi Bi+Bp=B as; dBi Bi+Bp=B
The sign of the derivative is thus determined by the midle factor. It is
easy to verify that the partial derivative of as wrt. Si may be written
a (S*)-(øl+1) { ( Bo) }as = _ i S~ - 1+ _' S*as; (f31 - 1)(f34 - 1)(f34 - f31)' B; p (C. IS)
The second term inside the curly brackets is identical to the lower bound
of Si, see Eq, (C.9). The expression inside the curly brackets is thus
positive. With f31 > 1 and f34 < O, the three terms in the denominator of
the term outside the curly brackets are positive, negative, and negative,
respectively. The nominator is positive. By collecting the results, and
taking into account the negative sign, we may conclude that
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Chapter 8
A FREEZE ON
INVESTMENTS
8.1 Introduction
The principal contribution of this chapter is the pricing function evalu-
ating a contingent claim with a future pay-off described by a truncated
power function of the price of the risky asset at the maturity date.
With this result, it is straightforward to evaluate some more complex
contingent claims.
The first case to be considered is a perpetual investment opportu-
nity, on which there for some reason is imposed a temporary freeze.
We illustrate this model by a numerical example using our base case
parameter values. In the second case, we look at a compound option
model, where the holder at a fixed future date may acquire a perpetual
investment opportunity. Finally, the perpetual investment opportunity
in the case of a production switch technology, previously discussed in
Chapter 7, is extended to allow for a fixed time lag between the devel-
opment decision date and the first possible date of production.
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8.2 The result
Consider a contingent claim related to the risky asset S, which prior to
the future date T pays nothing, and at the future date T pays
- _ ~ - _ {S(T)~ if S(T) < S
TJ(S(T) I S, e) = S(T) I(S(T) < S) - O if S(T) ~ S
(8.1 )
where the exponent e is a constant, S(T) is the price of the risky asset
at the future date T, and 1(·) is the indicator function.
Theorem l The current value of a claim on the pay-off S(T)~ at the
future date T} conditional on S(T) < S} is given by the function
w(S,t I S,e) = Vt[S(TYI(S(T) < S)] = e'\5~N[-d] (8.2)
where Vt[·] is a genemi evaluator} and where we define
A(t I e) == [(e - l)r - eh + ~e(e - 1)0"2](T - t) (8.3)
d(S, t I 5, c) = In(SjS) + [r - h+ (e - ~)0"2](T - t) (8.4)
O"J(T - t)
and where 5 is the current price of the risky asset.
Proof: For t < T, the function 'li (5, t) satisfies the general partial
differential equation
~0"252w ss + (r - h)Sw s - rW + 'lit = O (8.5)
The function W(S, t) has the limiting values
lim W(5, t) = Os.....OO (8.6)
{
00 if e < O
lim w(5, t) = e-r(T-t) if e = O
s.....O O if e > O
{
5(T)~ if S(T) < S
lim \I1(S, t) = ~5(T)~ if S(T) = S
t .....T O if 5(T) > S
(8.7)
(8.8)
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see Appendix A.
The property stated in Eq. (8.5) means there exists a self-financing
trading strategy, by which the future pay-off \II(S, T) received at date
T may be attained in the market today at the price \II(S, t). By com-
paring the desired pay-off 1} at date T in Eq, (8.1) with the pay-off
limt .....T \II(S, t) in Eq. (8.8), provided by the self-financing strategy as-
sociated with the value process \Il, we see that the two future pay-offs
are identical except for the case of S(T) = S. With our price process,
however, the event
{S(T): S(T) = S I S(t)}
has zero probability. We thus have that
Pr {S(T) : \II(S(T), T) = 1}(S(T)) I S(t)} = 1
almost surely.
We may now call upon the theory on pricing on contingent claims,
originated in Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981).
One of the key results from this theory is that "a contingent claim X
is said to be attainable at price 7r in our security market model if there
exists a self-financing trading strategy if> with associated market value
process V, such that Vo = 7r and VT = X, almost surely" , see p. 220 in
the latter article.
We may thus conclude that the contingent claim with future pay-off
1} is priced by arbitrage by
\II(S,t I s.e, = Yt[1}(S(T) I S,e)]
and this completes the proof of Theorem 1. O
We see from Eq, (8.6) that the current value of the claim converges
to zero when S approaches infinity. The intuition behind this result is
that the probability of 1} providing a positive pay-off at date T is close
to zero when S is large.
In the hypothetical case of S = O, we know from the price dynamics
discussed in Section 2.3 that the price at the future date T will be
S(T) = O. This observation implies that the event S(T) < S will occur
with probability one. The asset thus corresponds to a riskless claim
on the future pay-off lime .....o S~. The current value of the claim is thus
found by discounting the risk-free future pay-off at the rate r , leading
to Eq. (8.7).
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8.2.1 A "pure"claim on the power function
Consider a claim on the future power function pay-off, that is not made
contingent on the spot price at the maturity date T being lower than
some level S. The future pay-off from this claim may be written
jim TJ = S(T)t;
8-+00
(8.9)
see Eq. (8.1). It is easy to verify from Eq. (8.4) that S ---+ 00 implies
d ---+ -00, and N[ -dl ---+ 1. The current value of this "pure" claim on
the power function pay-off is
Vt[S(TYl = jim 'li = eASt;
8-+00
(8.10)
see Eqs. (8.2) - (8.4).
Now, suppose that weinsteadevaluatethefuture pay-off in Eq. (8.9)
by the traditional RADR method, discounting back the expected fu-
ture pay-off by the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate p. To be
consistent with market values, this method is required to give the same
result as in Eq. (8.10). We thus have
By inserting the expected future pay-off? on the right hand side of this
expression, and by using the definition of h and A, Eqs. (2.3) and (8.3)
respectively, we find that the implicit market RADR p is
p = c(& - r) + r
in this case. Note that the risk premium related to the power function,
p - r, corresponds to the risk premium of S, & - r, adjusted with the
exponent c.
lThe expected value of S(T)£, as viewed from date t, is
where S is the spot price at date t. The expression is found by applying Ingersoll
(1987) p. 14 to obtain the expected value of the normally distributed future spot
price, defined in Eq. (2.2).
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8.2.2 A contingent claim on the riskless asset
With e = O, TJ describes a one dollar pay-off conditional on the future
price of the risky asset S(T) being lower than S. The current value of
this contingent claim on the riskless asset is
Vt[I(S(T) < S)] - \l1(S,ti s,« = O)
= e-r(T-t)N[-d2] (8.11)
where
d,(S) '" d(S, I I S, e = O) = ln(SjS) + [ri S - !o-'J(T - I) (8.12)
a (T - t)
see Eqs. (8.2) - (8.4). By inserting db defined in Eq. (5.2), into Eq. (5.3),
and rearranging, we find that d2 defined in the case of the European
option is similar to Eq. (8.12).
The limit
jim W(S, t I S, e = O) = e-r(T-t)
8-00
(8.13)
is the current value of receiving one dollar at date T, compare with
Eq. (2.4).
8.2.3 A contingent claim on the risky asset
By inserting e = 1 into Eq, (8.1), we see that the future pay-off TJ
corresponds to a claim on a delivery of the risky asset if and only if the
future price S(T) is lower than S. Note that .\(t le = 1) = -8(T - t).
The current value of this contingent claim on the risky asset is
Vt[S(T)I(S(T) < S)] W(S,t I S,« = 1)
= e-c5(T-t)SN[-dl] (8.14)
where
- [ I 2]
d (S) = d(S I S _ ) _ ln(Sj S) + r - 8 +"2a (T - t) (8.15)
l - ,t ,e - 1 - aJ(T _ t)
Note that dl in Eqs. (5.2) and (8.15) are similar.
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The limit
Jim lI!(S,t I s,« = 1) = e-8(T-t)S
S-+oo
(8.16)
is known as the forward identity. That is, the value at date t of a claim
on a delivery of the risky asset at the future date T, see Eq. (2.5).
8.2.4 The European put option
Now, consider a European put option written on S with exercise price
S and time to maturity T - t. With an optimal exercise of the option,
the future pay-off from the option is
Y(S(T)) = { ~- S(T) if S(T) < S
if S(T) ~ S (8.17)
Note that the future pay-off from the put option Y(T) may be decom-
posed into a claim on S dollars, and an obligation to deliver one unit of
the risky asset, where both claims are made conditional on the future
price S(T) being lower than the exercise price S. The two claims may
be expressed by using the function TJdefined in Eq. (8.1). We thus
write the future pay-off from the put option as
Y(S(T)) = STJ(S(T) I s,« = O) - TJ(S(T) I s.« = 1) (8.18)
where S represents a constant.
By using the evaluator lI!, some rearranging lead to that the current
value of the European put option is
(8.19)
By comparing Eq, (8.19) and (5.4), we see that the expressions are
equivalent. With 8 = O, we have the Black-Scholes pricing formula for
a European put option, see, e.g., Ingersoll (1987) p. 320.
8.2.5 The European call option
The future pay-off from a European call option written on S with ex-
ercise price S and time to maturity T - t is
Y(S(T)) = { ~(T) - S
if S(T) < S
if S(T) ~ S
(8.20 )
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conditional on optimal exercise. By decomposing Y into pay-offs de-
scribed by the 7]-function above, we have
Y(S(T)) = S(T)-S-7](S(T) I s,« = l)+S7](S(T) I s,« = O) (8.21)
The two first terms represent the pay-off at date T from receiving one
unit of the risky asset and paying the amount of S dollars. The two
last terms represent the value of a commitment to deliver one unit of
the risky asset and a claim on S dollars, both with maturity date T and
made contingent S < S. The two last terms thus represent the future
pay-off from a put option with exercise price and time to maturity
identical to the call option", see Eq. (8.18) above.
By using the evaluator \li above, and rearranging, we find that the
current value of the European call option is
(8.22)
With 8 = O, we have the famous Black-Scholes formula, see, e.g., In-
gersoll (1987) p. 314.
8.3 The future accept/reject decision
With our result above, we may evaluate directly the future accept / reject
investment opportunity, discussed in Chapter 5. We recall that the
2By using this fact, and by evaluating both sides of Eq. (8.21) as viewed from
date t, we obtain the famous put - call parity
where both options have exercise price S and time to maturity T - t. The value of
the call may be found by inserting Eq. (8.19) into this expression, and rearranging.
In the finance literature, see, e.g., Jarrow and Rudd (1983), the put-call parity
with dividends is often expressed by the current stock price and the present value
of future dividends, rather than by our term e-6(T-t)S just above. The current
value of future dividends is identical to the value of holding one unit of the "twin
asset", and selling one futures contract on the same asset with maturity date T.
The current value of this strategy is S - e-6(T-t)S, c.f., Eq. (2.5). By inserting this
expression into Eq. (4-3) of Jarrow and Rudd (1983), we obtain the put-call parity
as stated in this footnote.
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value of the accept/reject investment decision at the decision date T is
Yc(S(T), T) = { ~S(T) - B(T)
if S(T) < SBE(T)
if S(T) ~ SBE(T) (8.23)
where SBE(T) = B(T)/ A is the break-even price at the future decision
date T. By using Theorem 1, we obtain that the value at date t of
receiving an accept/reject investment opportunity at the future date T
IS
(8.24)
where B = B(T) and SBE= SBE(T) both are related to the future date
T. By using that both the total costs and thus the break-even price
escalates exponentially at the rate 1r, it can be verified that Eq. (8.24)
is equivalent to the results presented i Chapter 5, Eqs. (5.1) - (5.3).
8.4 A freeze on investments
In Chapter 6, we assumed that the perpetual investment opportunity
can be exercised at any time. In some cases, however, there may exist
a restriction with respect to the earliest possible initiation date. One
example is the Government, due to political considerations, imposing a
temporary freeze on undeveloped oil fields. Another example is where
two neighboring undeveloped oil fields for some reason may not be
developed simultaneously, even if so desired. The results derived in this
chapter provides the tools required to deal with this kind of problems.
The restriction with respect to the earliest possible initiation date
T represents a reduction of the feasible set of actions available to the
holder of the investment opportunity. With the assumed price dynam-
ics of oil, there is a positive probability that the spot output price
will hit the trigger price before date T, indicating that immediate ini-
tiation is optimal. Due to the restriction, then, the oil field may be
kept undeveloped, whereas immediate development, from the holders'
point of view, is optimal. Hence, the value W of the delayed perpetual
investment opportunity is less than the pure one U, and we thus have
W(S(t), t) < U(S(t), t)
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On the other hand, it is clearly possible for the holder of the investment
opportunity to undertake a commitment to initiate at the expiration
date of the freeze. Similarly, he may promise never to develop. How-
ever, fixing the two mentioned strategies today are not optimal, and we
may thus conclude that
W(S(t),t) > max{C(S(t),T),O}
where the commitment value C(S(t), T) is given by Eq. (4.5).
At the earliest possible initiation date T, the undeveloped oil field
represents a pure perpetual investment opportunity. The future value
of the oil field at the future date T is hence given by Eq. (6.7)
{
aS(T)f3
U(S(T)) = AS(T) - B
if S(T) < S*
if S(T) ~ S* (8.25)
where 0'., B, and S* are related to date T. If the oil price at the
future date T equals or exceeds the trigger price S*, development will
be initiated immediately.
It is easy to verify that the future pay-off U(S(T)) alternatively may
be written
U(S(T)) - a"l(S(T) I S*, /3)
+ A(S(T) - "l(S(T) I S*, 1))
B (1 - "l(S(T) I S*, O)) (8.26)
The first term is identical to the future value from the number of o'.
claims on the power function pay-off, received if and only if the future
price S(T) < S*. The remaining terms represents the future pay-
off from receiving the quantity of A risky assets and paying B dollars,
combined with a position that cancels this transaction when S(T) < S*.
By using our results above, and rearranging, we obtain that the
current value of the delayed perpetual investment opportunity is
W - aeA(t1f3)Sf3N[-d(S,t I S*,/3)]
+ Ae-6(T-t)SN[d1(S*)]
Be-r(T-t) N[d2(S*)] (8.27)
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where a, B, and S* are related to the future date T, and S is the
current spot price. The first term in the expression above is the value
of receiving the undeveloped oil field if and only if the future price
S(T) is lower than the trigger price S*. The remaining terms reflect
the value of receiving the undeveloped oil field if and only if the future
price indicates immediate development.
Now, we consider a numerical example using our base case parame-
ter values.P In Section 6.4, we found that the parameter values translate
into f3 = 2, a = 41~' and S* = 16 USD/barrel. Furthermore, suppose
that the remaining time to the expiration of the freeze is T - t = 4
years.
The results are illustrated in Figure 8.1. The kinked line repre-
sents the current value of an immediate accept/reject opportunity to
undertake a commitment to start development at the future date T. If
undertaken, the current value is given by Eq. (4.5).
The upper curve is the value of the oil field in the case of a non-
expiring investment opportunity, which may be initiated immediately,
if so desired. We discussed this decision situation in Section 6.2.
The remaining curve in Figure 8.1 reflects the field value when there
is imposed a 4-year freeze on development of the non-expiring invest-
ment opportunity. The freeze prevents the project from being initiated
before the initiation date T of the freeze. With a low current spot price,
the probability that S will hit the trigger price from below before date
T is low. The value of the project is then close to the field value with-
out any freeze. With S being high, immediate investments are optimal,
but not feasible. It is, however, likely that the spot price S(T) at the
future date T will indicate development at that date, and the project
is thus similar to a future commitment.
The vertical difference between the two upper curves in Figure 8.1
represents the opportunity loss of the freeze. As we would expect, it
increases with a higher spot price, and converges towards the difference
between the value of the non-expiring investment opportunity and the
current value of undertaking a commitment to develop at the future
date T.
3We recall from Section 3.4 that 8 = 0.06, r = 0.05, 7r = O, (J'2 = 0.07, A = 130,
and B = 1040.
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8.5 A compound investment opportunity
In the section above, we consider a claim on a future delivery of a
perpetual investment opportunity. To complicate things, suppose that
the project of interest gives the holder the right to acquire a perpetual
investment opportunity at the fixed future date T by investing Bi dol-
lars at that date. As viewed from the current date t, the project thus
corresponds to a compound option, that is, a European option written
on a perpetual American option.
The pay-off pattern at the future date T depends on the future
price of oil S(T). Moreover, it also depends on the relation between the
critical price indicating exercise of the European option at the maturity
date T, 5, and the critical price indicating immediate exercise of the
perpetual American option at that date, S*.
With S* :::; 5, it is always optimal to "kill" the American option
immediately if the European option is exercised. In this case, the value
of the project at the future date T is
{
O
U(S(T)) = O
AS(T) - Bp - Bi
if S(T) < S*
if S· ~ S(T) < 5
if 5 ~ S(T)
(8.28)
We see that U(S(T)) in Eq. (8.28) is identical to the value of an ac-
cept/reject investment opportunity with break-even price 5 = (Bi +
Bp)/ A. The current value is thus found by substituting 5 for SBE, and
Bi +e, for B, in Eq. (8.24) above.
With S* > 5, there is a positive probability that, given the Eu-
ropean option is exercised, it might be optimal to keep the American
option "alive". In this case, the future value of the project corresponds
to
U(S(T)) = { ~S(T)Ø - Bi
AS(T) - Bp - Bi
if S(T) < 5
if 5 ~ S(T) < S·
if S· ~ S(T)
(8.29)
where 5 = (Bi/a)l/Ø. Eq, (8.24) is now insufficient. However, by
using our evaluator presented above, we arrive at the following current
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project value
W - ae,\(tli3)Si3(N[-d(S, tiS*, Ø)]- N[-d(S, t I B, ;3)])
Bie-r(T-t) (N[-d2(S*)]- N[-d2(B)])
+ Ae-S(T-t)SN[d1(S*)]
(Bp + Bi)e-r(T-t) N[d2(S*)] (8.30)
The term in the first line represents the value of a claims on a pay-
off according to the power function, contingent on the future price S(T)
being between Band S*. The term in the next line is the value of a
future obligation to pay the amount of Bi dollars conditional on the
same event. The term in the third line is the value of a future claim
on delivery of A units of oil contingent on the future price S(T) ~ S*,
while the remaining term represents the value of an obligation to pay
the amount of (Bp + Bi) dollars in the same state.
With the investment cost Bi approaching zero, exercising the Eu-
ropean option at date T will always be optimal, that is, B --+ O. The
future pay-off in Eq. (8.29) then converges towards Eq, (8.25), and
we thus have the temporary freeze on investments, considered in the
section above, as the limiting case.
8.6 Investment with a time lag
In Chapter 7, we analyzed an investment opportunity on an oil field
with a production switch. We then implicitly assumed that the devel-
opment is instantaneous. Now, suppose instead that there is a fixed
time lag between the date of the irrevocable investment decision and
the first possible production date."
From Eqs. (7.19) and (7.20), we know that the value of the developed
oil field at the first possible production date T is
if S(T) < S;
if S(T) ~ S;
(8.31)
4Majd and Pindyck (1987) consider a case where it takes time to build, and
where the holder has the flexibility to stop the development temporarily. If the
development is stopped, both the investment costs and the first possible date of
production are delayed.
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where S; is the trigger price indicating that producing at date T is
optimal, given by Eq. (7.17).
Eq. (8.31) may be decomposed into a sum of pay-off functions
",(S(T) I S,e), see Eq. (8.1), which each is priced by the evaluator
w(S,t I S,e) of Theorem 1. It can be verified that the value at the
current decision date t of initiating development of the project (except
for investment cost) is
V Qle'\(tIØl)SØlN[-d(S,t I S;,,81)]
+ Q7e,\(tIØ4)SØ4N[d(S,t I S;,,84)]
+ Ae-6(T-t)SN[d1(S;)] - Bpe-r(T-t) N[d2(S;)] (8.32)
The first term in the equation above represents the present value of
a future claim on the developed oil field at date T if and only if it is non-
optimal to start production at that time. The next term represents the
present value of receiving the pure option value of the oil field at date
T if and only if it is then optimal to start production immediately. The
remaining terms represent the value of a contingent claim on a similar
oil field without any production switch, conditional on the same event.
Above, we have a closed form solution describing the value of the oil
field (before investment costs Bi) contingent on an immediate develop-
ment decision. Now, suppose that the investment decision in principle
may be deferred perpetually, and that there is no cost escalation. This
perpetual investment opportunity represents a contingent claim, and
its value W satisfies the familiar PDE5
(8.33)
Further, the boundary conditions are similar to the conditions de-
scribing the investment opportunity in Chapter 6. First, we have the
"low price" condition
lim W = Os.....o (8.34)
Second, the condition describing the critical oil Si indicating that im-
mediate development decision is optimal
W(Si) = V(Si) - Bi (8.35)
5The investment opportunity is by assumption perpetual. Furthermore, both the
investment costs Bi and the production costs Bp are independent of the development
decision date t. Thus, we argue that the partial derivative Wt is zero.
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Third, the "high contact" condition, stating that at Si, the two assets
have equal risk
Ws(Sn = Vs(Sn (8.36)
The PDE and the "low price" boundary condition, Eqs. (8.33) and
(8.34), respectively, give us the expression of the value of the investment
opportunity
(8.37)
where the exponent /31 is defined by Eq. (7.21). The constant a and
the critical price indicating immediate investment, Si, are determined
by the two remaining boundary conditions.
No closed form solution exists in this case. For given parameter
values, however, it is straightforward to find a and Si by iterative
procedures. The existence of a time lag will reduce the set of feasi-
ble actions available to the holder of the oil field. Hence, the critical
price indicating immediate investment increases, and the value of the
investment opportunity decreases, with an increased time lag.
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Figure 8.1
The value of the oil field
,,
8 12 14 16 18 2010
Current spot output price (USD /ba rrel)
Immediate accept/reject opportunity to undertake
o commitment to initiate at the future dote T
Opportunity to invest at any time after date T
(The case of o tem porary freeze)
------ Opportunity to invest at any time
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Appendix A
The evaluator function 'li
A.l The partial differential equation
Proposition 5 The function w(S, t) satisfies the partial differential
equation
~0-2S2WSS + (r - 8)Sws - rW + Wt = O (A.l)
Proof: The partial derivatives of the function W(S, t) are
\li
\lis = (c - F) S
Wss = {c(c -1) - 2cF + o-~ + F} :2
\lit {-(c -l)r + c8 - ~c(c-1)0-2
+ (r - 8 + (c - ~)0-2 - ~) F} \li (A.4)
(A.2)
(A.3)
where we define
F=F(S,tIS,c)= n[d(S,tIS,c)] (A.5)
O-VT - tN[-d(S, tiS, c)]
and d = d(S,t I S,c) is defined by Eq. (8.4) above. By inserting
the partial derivatives, Eqs. (A.2) - (A.4), into the left hand side of
Eq. (A.l) above, we find that the equation is satisfied. The proposition,
stated as Eq. (8.5) in Theorem 1, is thus verified. O
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A.2 The boundary conditions
Proof of Eq, (8.6) in Theorem 1: It can be seen from Eqs. (8.2)
- (8.4) that we have the two limits
lim S~ = { ~
S-oo
00
if c < O
if c = O
if c> O
lim N[-d] = O
S-oo
In the case of c :::;O, by combining the two limits, we see directly that
lim 'l1(S, t) = O
S-oo
With c > O, we have by l'Hopitals rule that
lim 'l1(S, t)
S-oo
By inserting the definition of the standard normal probability density
function, and the partial derivative 8( -d)/8S, some rearranging gives
x
lim 'l1(S, t) = - ce lim (e(~-2) ln(S)- td2)
S-oo ~uJT-tS-oo
Note from Eq. (8.4) that the expression In(S) enters in d. This means
that the exponent in the last factor just above represents a square
expression in In(S). By completing the square, we obtain
lim 'l1(S, t) = kl lim (e-t(k2ln(S)-k3)2)
S-oo S-oo
where kb k2, and k3 are constants. Clearly, the expression on the right
hand side has the limit zero. We may thus conclude that
lim 'l1(S, t) = O
S-oo
(A.6)
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and Eq. (8.6) in Theorem 1 is verified. O
ProofofEq. (8.7) in Theorem 1: It can be seen from Eqs, (8.2)
- (8.4) that we have the two limits
{
(X) if e c O
lim se = 1 if e = O
8-0 O if e > O
limN[-d(S)] = 1
8-0
By combining the two limits, and noting from Eq. (8.3) that ,\(t I € =
O) = -r(T - t), we have the result
{
(X) if e < O
lim W(S, t) = e-r(T-t) if e = O
8-0 O if e > O
(A.7)
stated as Eq. (8.7) in Theorem 1. O
Proof of Eq. (8.8) in Theorem 1: From Eq. (8.4), it follows
that
l· d l' (ln(SjS) [r-8+(€-~)0-2]JT'=t)1m = 1m + -=---__ ;,__---,=-,---,;,___-
t-T t-T o-vT - t o-
The limit of the second term is zero. From the first term, we thus have
lim d = O if S = S
t-T
and
lim d = lim (ln(SjS) ) = { -00
t-T t-T O-VT - t 00
The result implies
if S < S
if S > S
lim N[-dJ = { i
t-T 2
O
if S < S
if S = S
if S > S
From Eq. (8.3) it is easy to see that limt_T '\(t
1imt-T eA = 1. We may conclude that
{
se
lim W(S, t) = ~se
t-T O
I €) = O, and thus
if S < S
if S = S
ifS>S
(A.8)
which represents Eq, (8.8) in Theorem 1 O
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Appendix B
The derivation of \li
In Section 8.2 and Appendix A above, we find that the current value
of the future pay-off 1](S(T) I S, s), defined by Eq. (8.1), is
Vt[I(S(T) < S)S(TYl = \lI(S, t I s, s)
where \li is given by Eqs. (8.2) - (8.4). The proof above is based on
knowing the solution \li in the first place, however, and by checking
that this function satisfies the necessary conditions. In this appendix,
we show how the function \li is derived.
From Eq, (2.2), we know that the spot output price at the future
date T, conditional on the price at the current date O being So, may be
written
(B.1)
where the random variable X = aZ(T) is normally distributed with
expectation zero and variance ((j2T). The riskfree rate of interest is
r, Furthermore, the economy is "frictionless", and characterized by
continuous trading and no riskfree arbitrage opportunities.
Our economy is generated by a geometric Brownian motion, and is
thus similar to the model of Black-Scholes. Harrison and Kreps (1979)
proves that this economy is complete. This result enables us to draw
upon powerful theory for evaluating contingent claims."
Harrison and Pliska (1981) describes a contingent claim as an asset
providing a pay-off Y at the maturity date T, and no pay-off prior to
!See, e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1979), Harrison and Pliska (1981), and Aase
(1988). For an application, see Ross (1989).
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this date. The future pay-off Y is defined as a non-negative random
variable, which at the horizon date T is measurable with respect to
the price history of the underlying asset. Completeness means that
there for each contingent claim exists a self-financing trading strategy,
associated with a market value process V, so that VT = y almost surely
at the horizon date. The unique price at which the contingent claim
may be attained in the market today is2
Va[Y] = e-rT E~[Y] (B.2)
where the expectations operator Eå['] is associated with a particular
probability measure.
Now, consider a contingent claim in our economy, with no pay-off
prior ot the future date T, and with pay-off Y(X) at date T.3 As our
economy is complete, this claim may be attained in the market today at
an unique price, given by Eq.(B.2). By Riesz representation theorem,
Eq. (B.2) may be written as
Va[Y(X)] = e-rT Eo[Y(X)e(X)] (B.3)
where E[·] is the expectations operator associated with the true proba-
bility measure, and where e(X) is unique." Before presenting e(X), we
make some comments on the intuition behind the evaluation rule.
We may alternatively state Eq, (B.3) as
Va[Y(X)] = e-rT J Y(x)e(x)f(x)dx (BA)
where f(x) is the probability density function of X.5
2See Harrison and Pliska (1981) Eq. (1.15).
3We assume that E[y2(X)] < 00, which may be interpreted as the future pay-off
having a finite variance.
4E[e(X)] < 00.
5The probability density function /(:e) is
/(:e) = n [ :err;:;] =kexp{-! ( :err;:;)2}av T 27r(T2T 2 (TV T
where n[·] is the standard normal density function.
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Note from Eq. (B.4) that the current value of the claim corresponds
to an integral, discounted back at the riskless interest rate. The integral
may be interpreted as the number of future claims on one dollar with
maturity date T being equivalent to the risky future pay-off Y, given
the current information set.
The product ~(x)f(x)dx in Eq, (B.4) translates a one-dollar claim
received at date T conditional on X E [x, x + dx), into the equivalent
numbers of future riskless claims on one dollar. The product ~(x)f(x)
thus represents an implicit price function of claims made conditional
on the random variable X, given the current information set.
We may interpret X E [x, x + dx) as a state. The future one-dollar
claim, made conditional on this state, may be attained in the market
today at the price e-rT~(x)f(x)dx. .
The random variable X is by assumption normally distributed, and
we thus have the probability density function f(x) > O for all x. Sup-
pose for the moment that there exists an outcome X E [x, x + dx) for
which the product ~(x)f(x) is non-positive. In that case, a one-dollar
claim made conditional on this future state, possibly providing a pay-
off at the future date T, may be attained in the market today for free
or at a "negative" price. With investors preferring more wealth to less,
however, this situation does not represent an equilibrium. We thus re-
quire future claims made conditional on X E [x, x + dx) to command a
positive current price. Moreover, to prevent arbitrage, this price must
be unique.
Now, consider for the moment a riskless claim on receiving one dollar
at the future date T. According to Eq. (B.4), the current value of this
claim is
Vo[Y(X) = 1] = e-rT J ~(x)f(x)dx
To rule out arbitrage, we see that the integral is required to be equal
to one.
To sum up, we know that the product ~(x)f(x) is positive and
unique for all x, and that its cumulative value is one. Hence, ~(x)f(x)
may be interpreted as a market based certainty equivalent function,
translating an uncertain future pay-off dependent on X into a riskless
future pay-off. Alternatively, ~(x)f(x) may be given the interpretation
of a risk-adjusted probability density.
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For Vo[·] to serve as an evaluator of contingent claims in our econ-
omy, it is a necessary requirement that the evaluator provides consistent
prices of both the future claim on one riskless dollar, and the future
claim on one unit of output. By combining the evaluator from Eq. (B.3)
with the two discounting rules, Eqs. (2.4) and (2.5), we have the two
conditions
Vo[Y(X) = 1] = e-rT ::} Eo[e(X)] = 1 (B.5)
Vo[Y(X) = ST(X)] = e-oT So ::} EO[ST(X)e(X)] = e(r-o)TS6B.6)
These two equations boil down to restrictions on e(x).
In our economy, the function e(x) is uniquely determined by the
two conditions above, and is given by"
(B.7)
where we define
(B.8)
6The underlying risky asset in our economy, with equilibrium expected rate of
return, is the "twin asset". Consider a self-financing portfolio of "twin assets" , with
initial value So at date O. The value of this portfolio at date T, discounted back at
the riskfree interest rate, is
v(T) = So exp {(a - r - !0'2)T + O'Z(T)}
c.f. Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3).
Compare our discounted price process v with the diffusion component in Eq. (3.2)
in Aase (1988). The Lt-function in Eq. (3.3) in the mentioned article translates in
our case into
We recall from Section 2.2 that a, r, and O'are constant. Furthermore, it follows
from the definition of the Brownian motion that foT dZ(t) = Z(T). We thus have
{ (A) (A)2 }
(t-r 1 (t-re = exp - -0'- Z(T) -"2 -0'- T
By inserting our definitions Il" == a - r and X == O'Z(T), and rearranging, we obtain
Eq. (B.7) above. It is fearly easy to verify that Eq. (B.7) satisfies the conditions in
Eqs. (B.5) and (B.6), and that E[e] < 00.
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The term f-l* represents the risk premium related to the "twin asset".
By inserting the normal density function f(x), footnote 5 in this
appendix, and the solution of ~(x), Eq, (B.7), into the implicit price
function, some rearranging leads to
[
X + f-l*Tl~(x)f(x) = n ayT (B.9)
We see that the price function ~(x)f(x) corresponds to the normal
density function with mean (f-l*T) and variance (a2T).
Now, consider the contingent claim Y(X) defined by
Y(X) = I(X < X)y(X) (B.10)
where"
(B.11 )
By inserting the pay-off from the contingent claim, Eq, (B.10), and the
implicit price function, Eq, (B.9), into the evaluation rule of Eq, (BA),
we obtain
f - [x + f-l*TlVo[Y(X)] = e-rT I(x < X)y(x)n ayT dx (B.12)
The integral just above may alternatively be written"
Vo[Y(X)] = e-rT f I(x < X + f-l*T)y(x - f-l*T)n [arrl dx (B.13)
The integral represents the expected value of a random variable gen-
erated by X, defined in the beginning of this appendix. We may thus
write
Vo[I(X < X)y(X)] = e-rT Eo[I(X < X + f-l*T)y(X - f-l*T)] (B.14)
7Formally, X is defined by
X =: (X: ST(X) = S I So} = ln(S/So) - (o: - ~(2)T
where ST(X) is defined in Eq. (B.l) above.
8Define for the moment a new variable x' == x+J.l*T. Use this definition, and the
implied relationship dx = dx', to express Eq. (B.l2) in terms of the new variable
z", Note that the probability density function of x', n[x' / uvT], is identical to the
probability density function of x, f(x), in footnote 5. By substituting x' for x in
the expression, we have Eq. (B.l3).
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where J-l. and X are defined by Eqs, (B.8) and (B.11), respectively, and
the probability density function of X is given in footnote 5.
B.l The contingent power function pay-
off
In this subsection, we use the evaluation rule obtained just above to
show that
\li == Vo[I(S(T) < S)S(T)E]
is identical to the solution presented in Eqs. (8.2) - (8.4). According to
the evaluation rule in Eq. (B.14) above, the current value of a future
claim on a pay-off described by the power function of the risky asset at
date T, conditional on S(T) < S, is
(B.15)
where J-l*, X, and ST(X) are defined by Eqs. (B.8), (B.ll), and (B.1),
respectively.
First, we insert the definition of ST('), with X - (a - r)T as the
argument, into Eq. (B.15). Some rearranging gives
To evaluate the expectation contained in this expression, we need the
following result.
Proposition 6 Consider a stochastic variable Z that is normally dis-
tributed with expectation J-l and variance (12. We then have
where 1(·) is the indicator function, and N[·] is the standard cumulative
normal distribution.
Proof: See Appendix B.2 below. O
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By using this result, with a suitable reinterpretation of parameters,
and by some rearranging, we obtain?
Finally, we insert X and p* into the argument of the cumulative normal
distribution, and arrive at the desired result
(B.16)
where
,\ (B.17)
d -
ln(So(S) + (r - b+ (c - ~)u2)T
uVf (B.18)
B.2 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the expected value
(B.19)
where the stochastic variable Z is normally distributed with expectation
p and variance 0'2.
The exponents on the right hand side of Eq, (B.19) may be written
as a constant and a square expression containing z. By collecting the
terms in z , completing the square, and rearranging, it may be verified
that we have the equivalent expression
( )
21 z - P 2 1 z - (p + c(2) 1 2 2-- (--) + cz = -- + cp + -c o'2 o' 2 o' 2
9We recall that X is normally distributed with zero expectation and variance
(T2T.
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Thus, by inserting the equivalent expression above into Eq. (B.19), and
by rearranging the integral, we obtain
The function inside the integral represents a truncated probability den-
sity function of a normally distributed random variable. The integral is
the probability that the value of this random variable, with expectation
fl + €U2 and variance u2, will be lower or equal to Z. We thus have the
result
(B.20)
See Ingersoll (1987) p. 15 for the special case € = 1. O
Chapter 9
A PROMISE TO INVEST
9.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the pricing function for a contingent claim with
a similar pay-off as the one considered in the previous chapter. In this
case, however, the future pay-off is made conditional on the price of the
underlying asset being lower than the trigger price for the entire period
from the current date and until the future maturity date.
The starting point of this chapter is a situation where the Gov-
ernment for some reason has promised to take steps so that the de-
velopment of a particular oil field, currently licenced to a commercial
company, will be initiated before a fixed future date. We interpret the
Governmental promise as a constraint on the set of possible strategies
available to the present or to the future owner of the field. In this set-
ting, the economic cost of the promise corresponds to the opportunity
loss induced by the imposed constraint.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 9.2, we use the tradi-
tional decision model to analyze the promise. We recall from Chapter 4
that the owner in this case at the decision date is to choose between
to accept the project, to reject it, or - once and for all - to fix a future
date at which development will be initiated.
We next proceed to the framework of contingent claims analysis.
In Section 9.3, we consider a situation where the perpetual investment
opportunity, if not yet developed by the commercial company at the
future date, is bought back by the Government at the market value, and
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investments initiated immediately. By calling upon a pricing function
derived in the appendix, we obtain the cost of the promise.
In Section 9.4, we assume that the oil field is bought immediately
by the Government at the fair market value, and transferred to the
national oil company with an instruction to initiate development not
later than the future date. In this case, the oil field corresponds to
a commitment to initiate before the terminal date, combined with a
"timing option". The flexibility reflects that the decision to initiate
development is made contingent on the future spot output price, rather
than fixing the initiation date in advance.
A numerical example is provided in Section 9.5. We conclude that
the traditional model underestimates the loss induced.
9.2 The traditional model
In this section, we analyze the costs of the Governmental promise ac-
cording to the traditional model. We recall from Chapter 4 that the
owner of the oil field is facing the three following decision alternatives:
To accept the project immediately, to fix - once and for all - a future
date at which the project will be initiated, or to reject it immediately.
The decision flexibility thus corresponds to an immediate choice be-
tween investment strategies that are uniquely determined by calendar
time.
The value of the oil field without the Governmental promise, con-
tingent on the optimal decision being made, is
V (S(t ), t) = max {max C(S(t ), T), O} (9.1 )
T?:_t
where C(S(t), T) is the current value of a commitment to initiate at
the future date T, see Eq. (4.5).
Given the promise to initiate before or at the fixed future date T,
the value of the undeveloped oil field is
V(S(t), t) = max_ C(S(t), T)
t~T~T
(9.2)
according to the traditional model.
Depending on the parameter values, we either have the optimal
timing model or we are left with the simple accept/reject model.
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9.2.1 Accept/reject
Suppose that O < r - 7r ~ 8. We then recall from Chapter 4 that the
traditional model collapses into the accept/reject decision situation In
the unconstrained case, the optimal decision rule is
Reject
Accept
if S(t) < SBE(t)
if S(t) ~ SBE(t) (9.3)
and the value of the undeveloped oil field is
v = { ~(S(t), t)
if S(t) < SBE(t)
if S(t) ~ SBE(t) (9.4)
In the constrained case, rejecting the project is not feasible. With
the restrictions on the parameter values, fixing an initiation date t <
T < T is never the superior decision! and the choice is thus between
accepting the project immediately, or to undertake a commitment to
initiate the project at the future date T. The spot price, indicating
indifference between the two alternative values AS - Band e-o(T-t) AS-
c(r-1r)(T-t) B, is
S(t) = gSBE(t) (9.5)
where the factor 9 is
1- e-(r-1r)(T -t)
9 == < 1 (96)1- e-o(T-t) .
If the current spot price of oil is S(t) is lower than gSBE(t), it is optimal
to initiate the project at the future date T. The value of the field in
the constrained case is thus
v _ { C(S(t), T)
- C(S(t), t)
if S < gSBE
if S ~ gSBE (9.7)
With S < SBE, rejecting the project is optimal, but not feasible, and
thus V < o.
The opportunity loss is defined by V - V. It is non-negative, and
zero if S ~ SBE.
Our findings are contained in the following table:
lFrom Chapter 4, we know that the interior solution (if any) of the first-order
condition in this case represents a minimum. The optimal value in the constrained
case is thus found on one of the boundaries, T = t or T = T.
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I Parameter values: O < r - 7r < 8-
Spot price Field value Opportunity loss
S V V V-V
S < gSBE O C(S,T) -C(S,T)
gSBE ~ S < SBE O C(S, t) -C(S, t)
SBE ~ S C(S, t) C(S, t) O
We see that the accept/reject decision model indicates an opportunity
loss only when the current spot price S(t) is below the break-even price
SBE(t).
9.2.2 Optimal timing
Suppose that O < 8 < r - 7r. In the unconstrained case, we recall from
Chapter 4 that the optimal decision rule is
Initiate at date TO< if S(t) < SOT(t)
Accept if S(t) ~ SOT(t) (9.8)
and that the value of the undeveloped oil field is
V _ { C(S(t), TO<)
- C(S(t), t)
if S(t) < SOT(t)
if S(t) ~ SOT(t) (9.9)
TO< is the optimal initiation date, and SOT(t) is the critical price indi-
cating that TO< = t.2
The constraint, induced by the Governments promise that the de-
velopment of the oil field will be initiated not later than the future date
2The optimal intiatation date TO< is defined by
T*(S(t» = t +max {o, In(SOT(t)jS(t»}
(r-1I")-8
and the critical price SOT, indicating T* = t, is
(
r-1I")SOT(t) = -8- SBE(t)
see Eqs. (4.7) and (4.8), respectively.
9.3. POSSIBLE FUTURE INTERVENTION 125
T, is binding only if T* > T. The spot price, associated with T* = T,
IS
S(t) = jSOT(t) (9.10)
where the factor j is
j == e-[(r-7r)-8](T-t) < 1 (9.11 )
...
The value of the oil field according to the optimal timing model is thus
{
C(S(t), T)
V = C(S(t), T*)
C(S(t), t)
if S(t) < jSOT(t)
if jSOT(t) ::; S(t) < SOT(t)
if SOT(t) ::; S(t)
(9.12)
in the constrained case.
Our results are contained in the following table:
I Parameter values: O < 8 < r - 7r
Spot price Field value Opportunity loss
S V V V-V
S < [Sor C(S, T*) C(S,T) C(S, T*) - C(S(t), T)
[ Sor ::; S < SOT C(S, T*) C(S, T*) O
SOT::; S C(S, t) C(S, t) O
We see that the optimal timing model indicates an opportunity loss
only when the current spot price S(t) is lower than jSOT(t). If the
spot price is higher, the model suggests that the promise is without
costs.
9.3 Possible future intervention
In the following sections, we interpret the undeveloped oil field as a
contingent claim. We assume that the commercial oil company in prin-
ciple may defer the investment decision perpetually, if so desired. Fur-
thermore, we assume that both parties have accepted that a possible
transfer of the oil field is to be based on a "mutual fair value". On
one hand, the Government is required to refrain from passing on new
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legislation that "changes the rules of the game". To force the company
to initiate development, or to expropriate the field, is thus not possible.
On the other hand, the company is not entitled to reject an offer from
the Government to buy back the undeveloped oil field at the market
value.
Suppose that the Government declares this strategy of buying back
the oil field at the future date T if the field is still undeveloped at that
date, and in that case it will undertake immediate development. With
this arrangement, the future status of the oil field determines whether
future costs are incurred or not, while the spot output price at date T
determines the level of the future costs (if any).
The net future cost of the transaction at date T, conditionalon the
field still being undeveloped at that date, is
Y(S(T), T) = U(S(T), T) - C(S(T), T) (9.13)
The first term in the equation above is the future market ...alue of the
perpetual investment opportunity, given by Eq. (6.7). The last term
represents the future value of a commitment to initiate the field at date
T, see Eq. (4.5).
By inserting Eqs. (6.7) and (4.5) into Eq. (9.13), we obtain the
equivalent expression
Y(S(T), T) = a(T)S(T)f3 - AS(T) + B(T) (9.14)
where a(T) and B(T) are related to the future date T.
The oil company will not suffer any loss from this possible future
transaction, as the price paid by the Government is equal to the future
market price of the non-expiring licence. During the period from date t
to T, the commercial company will thus manage the investment oppor-
tunity as if it is a perpetual one. From Chapter 6 above, we know that
the optimal strategy is to initiate development immediately whenever
the spot output price S( T) equals (or exceeds) the trigger price
(9.15)
In Eq, (9.15), the trigger price S; at the current date t is defined by
Eq. (6.5), and 7r is the escalation rate.
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The status of the oil field at date T is thus dependent on whether
the spot price of oil S( T) hits the trigger price S; during the period
T E lt, Tl or not. The current costs of the Governmental promise, L,
may thus be expressed as
L(S, t) = vt [Y(S(T), T)· I (inf (e7r(T-t)S; - S(T)) > O)] (9.16)
TE[t,T]
where vt[·] is a general evaluator, and where Y(S(T), T) is defined by
Eq. (9.14).
To evaluate the future costs L(S, t), we now call upon the following
result:
Theorem 2 The current value oj a contingent claim with pay-off at
the [uiure date T described by the power Junction o] the price S at that
date, S(T)e, and made conditional on the price S( T) being lower than
S; [or all dates T E lt, Tl, is
r.p(S,t I ST,e) = vt [S(TY· I C!U~T](e7r(T-t)S; - S(T)) > o)]
{
IlI(S, t I ST, e)
- O(ST)e-KIlI(S, t I ST,II:) iJ S(t) < ~~.17)
iJ S(t) ~ s;
where
ln(S; / S)
II:(S, t I e) = e + 2 (72(T _ t) (9.18)
The Junction III is defined by Eqs. (8.2) - (8.4) in the previous chapter.
Proof: See Appendix A and Appendix B. O
With S(t) ~ Sr, the condition for the claim to provide a positive
pay-off at the future date T is violated. The current value of the claim
is thus zero, as stated in Eq. (9.17).
Next, consider the case of S(t) < Sr. We see from Eq, (9.17) that
the value of the claim then is expressed by the function Ill. Recall from
Chapter 8 that III represents the pricing function of a pay-off at the
future date T according to a power-function of the spot price at that
date, S(T)e, received if and only if S(T) < ST'
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The function r.pis somewhat more complex than \li, as it evaluates a
claim that is made conditional on the spot price S( T) being lower than
the trigger price S; for all dates T E [t, T]. From Eq. (9.17), we see
that r.pis written as the value of its counterpart \li only dependent on
the event S(T) < ST, minus a discount. This discount reflects that r.p
provides no pay-off at the future date T if the spot price S( T) hits the
trigger price S; in the meantime.
By using Theorem 2 to evaluate each of the terms in Eq. (9.14), we
find that the current cost of the promise is
L(S,t) o:(T)r.p(S,t I ST,(3)
- Ar.p(S,t I ST,1)
+ B(T)r.p(S,t I ST'O) (9.19)
where o:(T) and B(T) are constants.
The function L( S, t) satisfies the partial differential equation of
a contingent claim, see Appendix A. Furthermore, we show in Ap-
pendix A that the function L(S, t) has the following properties:
L(S, t) = O if S(t) ;:::S; (9.20)
lim L(S, t) e-r(T-t) B(T) (9.21 )
S--+O
{ o:(T)S(T)/3li~L(S, t) - AS(T) + B(T) if S(T) < ST (9.22)t--+T O if S(T) ;:::ST
We see from Eq. (9.20) that there is no opportunity loss when S( t) ;:::
S;. In this case, it is optimal for the commercial company to initiate
immediate development, and thus no need for future intervention.
If the spot price of oil is close to zero, the probability that the oil
field still will be undeveloped at date T is close to one. Furthermore,
the current value of the future production of oil is negligible. In this
case, the the promise is thus similar to a commitment to pay the costs
B(T) at the future date T, implying an opportunity loss as stated in
Eq. (9.21).
Finally, with the spot price being lower than the trigger price,
and the time to maturity T - t approaching zero, the promise boils
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down a commitment to implement the arrangement immediately, see
Eq. (9.22).
9.4 Immediate intervention
The arrangement considered in the previous section causes the commer-
cial company to behave somewhat "myopic", as the oil field is managed
during the period from date t to T as if no promise exists. Obviously,
if development is to be initiated before or at date T, this fact should
be taken into account when deciding upon the investment strategy.
Now, suppose instead that the Government buys the perpetual in-
vestment opportunity immediately at the current market value, and
instructs the national oil company to start development before or at
the future date T. To the national oil company, the transferred oil
field represents a commitment to initiate not later than date T. The
national company is not required to fix the initiation date in advance,
however, but may choose an investment strategy made conditional on
the future risky output price.
Given the Governmental instruction, the undeveloped oil field may
be interpreted as a contingent claim. Clearly, its current value W, is
bounded from below by the "traditional" field value in the constrained
case, V, where the initiation date T E [t, Tl is fixed in advance. On the
other hand, W is bounded from above by the value of the perpetual
investment opportunity. In short, we have argued
V(S, t) ~ W(S, t) ~ U(S, t) (9.23)
where V and U are given by Eqs. (9.2) and (6.7), respectively.
The value of the oil field, contingent on the Governmental instruc-
tion, W(S, t), satisfies the partial differential equation
(9.24)
Furthermore, boundary conditions must be specified.
First, suppose the current spot price of oil is close to zero. In that
case, the probability that the project will be initiated at the latest
possible date approaches one, while the current value of the future
production approaches zero. The obligation to initiate before or at the
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date T will thus converge towards an obligation to pay the investment
costs at this future date. We have
1~W(S, t) = _e-r(T-t) B(T) (9.25)
Second, if development has not been initiated before the future date T,
immediate development is required at that date, and thus
W(S, t = T) = AS(T) - B(T) (9.26)
Third, there exists a trigger price function Sw (r ), r E [t, Tl, describing
the investment strategy that maximizes the value of the oil field. This
condition is given by
W(Sw(r),r) = ASw(r) - B(r) (9.27)
The partial differential equation and the three boundary conditions
determine the field value and the optimal investment strategy.
Unfortunately, there exists no closed form solution to the field value
in this case. For a given set of parameter values, however, the value
W(S, t) and the optimal investment strategy may be approximated by
employing numerical methods."
It is now easy to obtain the opportunity loss given this arrangement.
We recall that the Government in this case acquires the perpetual in-
vestment opportunity immediately at the current market value U(S, t),
given by Eq, (6.7). The value of the undeveloped oil field when instruct-
ing the national oil company to initiate investments before or at date
T corresponds to W(S, t), examinedjust above. We may thus conclude
that the opportunity loss induced by the Governments promise is
Opportunity loss = U(S, t) - W(S, t) (9.28)
in this case.
The opportunity loss with this arrangement is less than the op-
portunity loss in the previous section. The reason for this is that the
promise now is taken into account when managing the oil field during
the period from date t to T.
3For a survey of numerical methods, see Geske and Shastri (1985).
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9.5 A numerical example
In this section, we provide a numerical example, using our base case
parameter values.t Furthermore, suppose that the undeveloped oil field
has to be initiated within T - t = 4 years.
From the previous chapters, we recall that the accept/reject break-
even price is SBE = 8 USD /barrel, and that the trigger price indi-
cating exercise of the perpetual investment opportunity, is S* = 16
USD /barrel.
With the base case parameter values, the traditional optimal tim-
ing model collapses into the simple accept/reject decision case.P The
critical price, indicating indifference between accepting the project and
to undertake a commitment to initiate at the future date T, is
gSBE = 6.8 USD/barrel
see Eq, (9.5) above.
In the case where the Government acquires the undeveloped oil field
immediately, and transfers it to the national company, the trigger price
indicating indifference between intiating immediately and deferring the
decision is"
Sw = 9.3 USD /barrel
This trigger price is a function of the remaining time to the maturity
date of the promise, T - t.
In the following table, we present the field values for several spot
prices, and given different degrees of decision flexibility.
4We recall from Section 3.4 that 6 = 0.06, r = 0.05, 11" = O, (J'2 = 0.07, A = 130,
and B = 1040.
5See Section 4.3 and note that 6 > r - 11".
6The trigger price Sw and the field value Ware found by using the explicit finite
difference method, see, e.g., Brennan and Schwartz (1978).
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FIELD VALUE (Mill. USD)
Spot Trad. model Option model
price V V U W
4.2 O -425 71 -423
4.9 O -350 98 -345
5.8 O -261 135 -251
6.8 O -157 188 -136
8.0 O O 260 6
9.4 184 184 360 184
11.1 401 401 499 401
13.1 656 656 692 656
16.0 1040 1040 1040 1040
18.8 1408 1408 1408 1408
The second column shows the value V in the case of an accept/reject
investment decision, e.f. Eq. (9.4). Note that V = O when the spot price
equals or is lower than SBE = 8 USD/barrel. In the third column,
we find the field value V in the corresponding constrained case. The
decision maker is here to choose between to develop immediately or
to undertake a commitment to initiate at date T, see Eq. (9.7). The
two field values V and V are equal when the current price exceeds the
break-even price SBE (8 USD/barrel), as accepting the project then is
optimal.
In the two last columns, the oil field is considered as a contingent
claim, where the investment strategy may be made dependent on the
development of the future spot output price. The fourth column repre-
sents the value in the case of a perpetual investment opportunity U, see
Eq, (6.7), whereas the last one takes into account the promise to initiate
before or at date T. When the spot price exceeds the trigger price S*
= 16 USD /barrel, initiating the non-expiring investment opportunity
is optimal, and the two field values U and Ware equal.
We note that the difference between the asset value in the con-
strained case according to the traditional model and the contingent
claim model, V and W, is small. This means that given the Govern-
ments instruction, the value of the flexibility to follow an investment
strategy made contingent on the future spot price, rather that fixing
the initiation date in advance, is negligible.
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The opportunity losses are given in the following table:
OPPORTUNITY LOSS (Mill. USD)
Spot Trad Option-model
pnce V-V L U-W
4.2 425 496 494
4.9 350 447 443
5.8 261 395 387
6.8 157 340 324
8.0 O 282 254
9.4 O 223 176
11.1 O 161 98
13.1 O 95 35
16.0 O O O
18.8 O O O
and is also illustrated in Figure 9.1.
According to the traditional model, an opportunity loss is incurred
only if the current spot price is lower than the break even price SBE.
From Figure 9.1, we see that V - V (the linear curve) is kinked in the
critical price gSBE, indicating indifference between investing immedi-
ately and undertaking a commitment to initiate at date T.
We see from the figure that the traditional model understates the
opportunity loss induced by the development promise. From the pre-
vious table, we recall that the numerical values of V and Ware ap-
proximately equal. This means that the difference U - V in this case
may serve as an approximation to the "true" opportunity loss U - W,
given by the contingent claim model. The difference in the opportunity
loss between the traditional and the contingent claim model is thus
mainly caused by the traditional model failing to evaluate properly the
unconstrained investment opportunity.
The numerical results indicate that if the Government bases the
decision to make a promise as considered above on on a traditional
model, this may lead to a serious loss of value.
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Appendix A
The evaluator function cp
Consider the contingent claim with a pay-off at the future date T,
defined by ,
Y::S(TY·I( inf (etr_(T-t)S;-S(T)) >0) (A.l)TE[t,T)
The future pay-off represents a random variable that is dependent on
the sample path of S from the current date t to the maturity date T.
It provides no pay-off at date T if the spot price S( T) equals or exceeds
the associated trigger price for some date T E [t, T].
Define the stopping date Ts by
Ts = inf{T E [t,oo): S(T):?: e7r(T-t)S;} (A.2)
The random variable Ts represents the first date for which the spot price
S equals or exceeds the corresponding trigger price. If the event
{Ts E [t,oo): Ts:::; T}
happens, the contingent claim will provide no pay-off at date T, and
we thus have Y = Owith probability one.
In the following, we divide the evaluation problem into regions.
A.l The interior region
Consider the region defined by
S(t) < S; and t < min{ r.,T}
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In this region, the claim is still "alive", with a positive probability of
providing a positive pay-off at the future maturity date T.
Proposition 7 In this region, the function <p( S, t), defined in Eqs. (9.17)
- (9.18), satisfies the partial differential equation
!a2S2<pss + (r - 8)S<ps - rep + <Pt= O (A.3)
and has the limiting values
lim <p(S,t) - Os-s:
(AA)
lim <p(S,t)
t-T
{
00 if c < O
- e-r(T-t) if c = O
O if c> O
_ {S(T)~ if S(T) < Sf
- O if S(T) = ST
(A.5)lim <p(S,t)
s-o
(A.6)
ProofofEq. (A.3): It can be verified that the partial derivatives
of <P are
vs - ws(S,t I Si-,e) - (Si-Y-Kws(S,t I Si-,K)
- (2F - 2 d ) <P (A.7)
ay'T - t S
vss - Wss(S,t I Si-,e) - (Si-Y-KWss(S,t I Si-,K)
2 ( d) (( 1 2 ad) <P (- 0'2 2F-2a~ K-2")a - ~ S2 A.8)
<Pt - Wt(S,t I Si-,e) - (Si-)~-KWt(S,t I Si-,K)
_ (2F _ 2 d ) ln(Sj ST) <P (A.9)
ay'T - t T - t
where
F = F(S, t I Si-, K) = n[d(S, t I Sf, K)]
ay'T - tN[-d(S, t I Sf, K)] (A.10)
d=d(S IS* )_ln(SjST)+(r-8+(K-!)a
2)(T-t) ( )- ,t T,K - ~ A.11
o' T - t
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By inserting Eq, (9.17) and Eqs. (A.7) - (A.9) into the partial dif-
ferential equation, Eq. (A.3), and by using the result from the previous
chapter that \If satisfies the partial differential equation, we find that
the remaining terms cancel out. Thus, the evaluator <p satisfies the
partial differential equation of a contingent claim. O
Proof of Eq, (A.4): We see from Eq. (9.18) that I\,(S;, t) = c.
By inserting S = S; and I\, = e into Eq. (9.17), the limit stated in
Eq, (A.4) is verified. O
Proof ofEq. (A.5): By taking the limit of each side of Eq. (9.17),
we have
lim <p(S, t I e)s....o lim \If(S,t I Si-,e)s....o
lim ((ST)e-It\If(S, t I ST' 1\,))s....o
By comparing Eqs. (8.7) and Eq. (A.5) just above, we see that the limit
on the left hand side and the limit of the first term on the right hand
side of the equation just above are identical. To verify Eq. (A.5), we
thus need to show that
By using the definition of \If, we may alternatively write the expression
just above as
where
ø -= [r - 7r - 8 + He - 1)a2](T - t)
We note from Eq. (9.18) that
lim I\,(S, t I e) = 00s....o
(A.13)
By inserting I\, from Eq. (9.18) into the expression of d, Eq. (A.ll), we
find that
limd(S,t I ST'I\,(S)) = 00s....o
and thus
lim N[-d(S, t I ST' I\,(S))] = Os....o
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If ()< O, we see directly from Eq. (A.12) that the limit is zero, and
Eq. (A.5) is thus verified. In the case of () ~ O, using I'Hopitals rule
and rearranging lead to
lim(S* )~-It(S)w(S t I S* K(S)) = -kl lim e-tk2[tu2(T-t)lt-o]2 = O
s .....o T ,T, It.....co
(A.14)
where kl and k2 are positive constants. We may thus conclude that
the limit of <p(S,tit:) in this case is determined by the limit of the
first term on the right hand side of Eq. (9.17), presented in Eq. (8.7).
Eq. (A.5) above is thus confirmed. O
Proof of Eq. (A.6): We know that the limit of the first term of
Eq. (9.17) is
lim w(S,t I Sj.,t:) = { fs~e
t .....T 2"
if S < ST
if S = ST
(A.15)
see Eq. (8.8) in the previous chapter. Now, consider the second term of
Eq. (9.17). By some rearranging, we may write the limit of this term
as
where () is defined by Eq. (A.13). From the definitions of () and K,
Eqs. (A.13) and (9.18), it follows that
lim eolt = ek3ln(Sf/S) > O
t--T
where k3 is a constant. Morover, we see that this limit is unity when S =
ST' By inserting K from Eq. (9.18) into the definition of d, Eq. (A.ll),
and rearranging, we find that the limit of d is
lim d(S, t I ST' K) = { 000t .....T
if S < ST
if S = ST
and thus
lim N[-d(S, t I ST' K)] = { ~
t .....T 2"
if S < ST
if S = ST
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We may conclude that the limit of the second term of Eq, (9.17) is
if S < ST
if S = ST (A.16)
By combining the results with respect to the two terms on the right
hand side of Eq. (9.17), Eqs. (A.15) and (A.16), respectively, Eq. (A.6)
is verified. O
Conclusion: From Eq. (A.3), we may conclude that the strategy
associated with the evaluator <p is self-financing in the region considered
here. Furthermore, Eq. (A.6) states that if S is lower than the trigger
price for the entire period from date t and to date T, i.e., T < Ts,
the value of the self-financing portfolio and the value of the contingent
claim Yare identical at the maturity date T.
A.2 The boundary
Now, consider the boundary
S(t) = S; and t = Ta::; T
This means that the price S at date t ::; T hits the trigger price from
below for the first time. This event causes the future pay-off from the
contingent claim to be zero with probability one. The current value of
the replicating portfolio is thus in this case required to be zero.
From Eqs, (AA) and (A.6) above, we see that the function, defined
in the interior region, has the limiting value
lim <p(S, T) = Ofor T E [t, Tl
8-8;
The value of the function in the interior region thus converges to the
required boundary value. We thus assign
<p(S(t) = S;,t = Ta) = O
at the boundary.
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A.3 A trivial boundary
Recall that the event, causing the contingent claim to provide no pay-
off, is defined on the sample path S from date t and until date T. In
the ,case where the price at the initial date t exceeds the corresponding
trigger price, we have
S(t) > S; =? 1"a = t
In this case, we know already at the initial date t that the contingent
claim has zero pay-off at date T. We thus require the value of the
replicating portfolio to be
<p(S, t) = O
when S(t) > S; and 1"8 = t.
A.4 The remaining region
The remaning region corresponds to the case where the condition for
the contingent claim to provide a future pay-off has been violated. In
this case, we assign
<p(S,1")=O
when r, < 1" ~ T.
A.5 Conclusion
We have verified that the function <p(S, t), stated in Eq. (9.17), satisfies
the self-financing condition, and generates a pay-off at the maturity
date T identical to Y, as defined in Eq. (A.l). We may thus conclude
that the function <p(S, t) is the pricing function of the contingent claim.
We recall from Eq. (9.19) that the opportunity loss from the promise
IS
£(S, t) - a(T)<p(S, t I sT' (3)
A<p(S, t I ST' l)
+ B(T)<p(S, t I ST' O) (A.I7)
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With a(T) and B(T) constant, L(S, t) is a linear combination of claims
which each satisfies Eq. (A.3). We may thus conclude that the function
L(S, t) satisfies the partial differential equation of a continent claim.
Furthermore, it follows from Eqs. (A.4) - (A.6) above that the func-
tion L(S, t) has the following properties:
L(S, t) - O if S(t) ~ S; (A.18)
lim L(S, t) e-r('f-t) B(T)
S-+O
(A.19)
liI!!_L(S,t) = {
t-+T
a(T)S(T)f3
AS(T) + B(T)
O
if S(T) < ST (A.20)
if S(T) ~ ST
The results are stated in Section 9.3 above.
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Appendix B
The derivation of the
evaluator cp
In Appendix A, we show that the function r.p satisfies the partial differ-
ential equation with suitable boundary conditions, and conclude that
it represents the desired pricing function. This proof relies on knowing
the function in the first place. Thus, in the following, we show how the
evaluator function is obtained.
Consider the claim with future pay-off
y = S(T)~I(S(T) < Sr)I(AT) (B.1)
where we define the event AT
AT={ inf (e1l"7'S~-S(T))>0}7'E[O,T] (B.2)
We can see that the pay-off from the claim at the future date T is
made conditional on the characteristics of the price path of S during
the period T E [O,tJ. This contingent claim may be attained in our
economy, see Harrison and Kreps (1979).1 The intuition behind this
interesting result is as follows: Suppose that the spot price S( T) has
lThe authors consider a general model where the economy is generated by a
multi-dimensional diffusion process. They note (p. 396) that "every contingent
claim may be expressed as a function of the vector price his tory over the interval
[O, t]" .
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been lower than the trigger price S; for the period [0, t]. The possible
event that the spot price will hit the trigger price from below during
the time interval lt, t + dt) is then dependent on the spot price at that
date, S(t), and the stochastic price increment dS(t). The fact that the
future pay-off from the claim is made conditional on the event AT does
not introduce any new dimension of uncertainty to our problem.
The unique price at which the claim Y may be attained today, is
r.p = Vo [S(Tt I(S(T) < sT )I(AT)]
= e-rT Eo [S(TY I(S(T) < ST)I(AT)e] (B.3)
where Vo[·] is a general evaluator, and where e represents the function
presented in Appendix B in Chapter 8. By using conditional expecta-
tion, we may alternatively write
r.p = e-rT Eo [S(T)e I(S(T) < sT )Eo[I(AT)e I S(T)]] (B.4)
The inner expectation represents the certainty equivalent of a one-dollar
claim contingent on the event AT, as a function of the future price S(T).
We recall from Appendix B in Chapter 8 that the unique function
for evaluating contingent claims with pay-off at date T, is
where the price at date T is
1ST(X) = SOe(a-'2<72)T+X
It is important to notice that e(X) only depends on the price ST(X)
at the terminal date. This means that given the terminal price ST(X),e is independent of whether the event AT has occurred or not.
The inner expectation of Eq. (B.4) may thus be written
Eo[I(AT)e I S(T)] = Pr{AT I S(T)}e
By inserting this expression into (B.4), we obtain
r.p = Eo [I(S(T) < ST) Pr{AT I S(T)}S(T)ee] (B.5)
The only factor not yet known to us is the conditional probability
Pr{AT I S(T)}.
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Proposition 8 The conditional probability is given by
Pr{ AT I S(T)} Pr { inf (e1rTS~ - S(r)) > O I So, ST}
TE[O,T]
- 1 - (ST/STY-K (B.6)
where
(B.7)
Proof: See Appendix B.1 below. O
Note that the conditional probability is independent of the drift
term of S. Thus, even if the investors disagree upon the parameter
value of a, they will agree upon the conditional probability.
Now, by inserting the conditional probability into the Eq. (B.5),
and by rearranging, we obtain
r.p - e-rT Eo [I(S(T) < ST)S(Tyel
(ST Y:-Ke-rT Eo [I(S(T) < ST)S(T)"el (B.8)
We see that the two expectations on the right hand side may be inter-
preted as contingent claims on the power-function pay-off. By calling
upon the result from Chapter 8, we have that the value of our path-
contingent claim is
r.p = '11(S,ti, ST'C:) - (ST)(e-K) '11(S,t I sT, K) (B.9)
where the parameter K is defined by Eq. (B.7) just above.
B.l The conditional probability
In this section, we find the conditional probability
p = Pr{ inf (e1rTS~- S(r)) > O I S(O) = So,S(T) = ST} (B.10)
TE[O,T]
We recall that the price process of the risky asset S( r) is
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where the term X( 7") is normally distributed with zero expectation and
variance U27".
It is easy to verify that the conditional probability P is equivalent
to
p = Pr { inf Z(7") > O I Z(O) = z; Z(T) = Zr}
rE[O,T]
where we define the transformed variable
and where
Il - 7r - Q: + tu2
Zo In(S~/So)
Zr = In(Sr/Sr)
We now need the following result
Proposition 9
{ . } (ZoZr)Pr mf Z(7") > O I Z(O) = Zo, Z(T) = Zr = 1 - exp -2~TrE[O,r) U
Proof: See Appendix B.2 below. O
By making the necessary substitutions, we find that the conditional
probability is
P pr{ inf (e1r'TS~ - S(7")) > O I S(O) = So,S(T) = Sr}
TE[O,T]
1 - (Sr/Sr Y-It (B.11)
where we define
_ 2In(So/ So)
/'i, = € + u2T
The result is stated as Eqs. (B.6) and (B.7) above.
(B.12)
B.2. THE BROWNIAN BRIDGE 147
B.2 The Brownian bridge
Consider a stochastic process Z (T) described by
Z(T) = Zo + ur + O'B(T) (B.13)
where Zo > Ois the initial value of the process, and B( T) represents the
standard Brownian motion. As viewed from date O, the process Z (T )
is normally distributed, that is, we have
Z( T) '" N (Zo + ur, O'2T)
We are interested in the conditional probability
(B.14)
p = Pr { inf Z(t) > O I Z(O) = Zo, Z(T) = ZT}
TE[O,Tl
P represents the probability that the process Z( T) will be positive for
the period from date O to T, contingent on the positive initial value
Z(O) = Zo and the positive terminal value Z(T) = ZT. The process,
restricted with respect to both the initial and the terminal value, is
known as a "Brownian bridge".
We know that the probability density function of the process value
at the future date T, conditional on the initial value being Zo, is
[
ZT - z, -/-tT]
Pr {ZT I Zo} = n O'VT dz (B.15)
where n[·] is the standard normal probability density function.
Furthermore, we know that the probability density function that
the process ends up with the positive value ZT at date T and follows a
sample path where Z(T) is positive from date O to T, given the positive
initial value Zo, is
Pr {ZT n ( inf Z(T) > o) I Zo} (B.16)
TE[O,Tl
= [ZT - Zo -/-tT] d _ (-2/-tZo) [ZT + Zo -/-tT] dn O'VT z exp 0'2 n O'VT z
see, e.g., Ingersoll (1987) p. 352.
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Now, according to the law of probability, we may express the desired
conditional probability P as
p = Pr {ZT n (infTE[o,T]Z(r) > O) I Zo}
Pr{ZT I Zo}
By inserting Eqs. (B.16) and (B.15) in the nominator and the denomi-
nator above, respectively, and by simplifying, we obtain that the desired
probability is
p _ Pr { inf Z(r) > O I Z(O) = z; Z(T) = ZT}TE[O,T]
1 - exp (_2Z0ZT) (B.17)
(j2T
With the product Z(O) . Z(T) = O, we see that the probability P is
zero. Further, P is an increasing function of both Z(O) and Z(T), and
converges towards unity as Z(O) . Z(T) -+ 00.
We note that the probability is independent of the drift term Il
of the process. Ceteris paribus, a higher variability (j2T reduces the
probability that the process will stay positive from date O to T.
Chapter 10
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The essence of this dissertation is the analysis of the investment decision
under output price uncertainty, applied to the case of an undeveloped
oil reserve. The aim has been to obtain a theoretical platform for the
optimal management decision strategy and the corresponding project
value. The methodology of contingent claims analysis has been applied.
We assumed that the spot price dynamics of output follows a geo-
metric Brownian motion. Furthermore, we introduced the traded "twin
asset" with equilibrium expected rate of return. The relationship be-
tween the price dynamics of output and the price dynamics of the "twin
asset" was described by a constant "rate of return shortfall" on out-
put. The assumptions lead to a fairly simple relationship between the
current value of a future claim on output and the current spot price.
An oil reserve, if developed, has been interpreted as a commitment
to extract oil according to a fixed preset production schedule, com-
bined with a commitment to pay the future costs incurred according
to a corresponding cost schedule. Investment has been assumed to be
irreversible and modeled as undertaking a developed oil field.
Several investment decision situations have been analyzed. We
started with the simple case of accept/reject, where the decision maker
choose between to undertake the project immediately or to reject the
project forever. Gradually, we allowed for more complex decision sit-
uations. We took explicitly into account the opportunity to defer the
investment decision itself, and to make it at some later date conditional
on relevant information received in the meantime. For each case, the
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optimal management strategy has been provided, stated in terms of a
break-even price decision rule. Furthermore, the corresponding optimal
project value was presented.
The contingent claims framework was also applied to evaluate the
economic cost of some regulations which may be imposed on an unde-
veloped oil reserve. The regulations were interpreted as constraints on
the feasible set of management strategies available to the owner of the
field, and the costs were evaluated by the implied opportunity losses.
In particular, we considered the case of a temporary freeze on develop-
ment, and a case of a promise to develop not later than a fixed future
date.
The results in this dissertation are not restricted to the case of oil.
The most promising area for practical applications of contingent claims
analysis, however, appears to be projects involving non-renewable re-
sources: First, in the case of a non-renewable resource, only companies
possessing a particular type of input (i.e., a reserve of the resource)
may produce the physical output. Second, the total future production
of output is more or less given by the characteristics of the reserve.
Third, the output is fairly homogeneous, and is for most cases associ-
ated with markets where both the commodity itself and financial assets
written on the commodity are traded.
Contingent claims analysis uses information, in principle derived
from the market, in order to obtain the implicit market value of the
project. One important challenge for further research is to which extent
relevant information actually may be extracted from market data.
In the case of oil, one approach to extract market information may
be to analyze stock prices of oil companies. A problem here, however,
is that many oil companies represent in fact a portfolio of different oil
reserves, rather than single projects. Furthermore, the stock prices may
be distorted by the corporate tax system and regulations imposed by
the Governments.
An alternative approach may be to analyze market prices of the
commodity itself and financial assets written on the commodity. The
assets for which market prices are available, however, are short-lived
whereas most oil projects are long-lived assets.
A topic of particular interest to the models presented in this disser-
tation is the market behaviour of the spot output price and the rate of
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ret urn shortfall (the convenience yield);' So far, one possible extension
of the assumptions made in this dissertation may be to model the spot
output price as a mixed diffusion and jump process, thus allowing the
price path to be discontiuous.? Another extention may be to describe
the rate of return shortfall as a function of time, or possibly as being
stochastic.P
There is, however, clearly a trade-off between the "realism" of a
model, and its possible applicability. The approach chosen in this dis-
sertation has been to tilt the assumptions in favour of simplicity, and to
adapt and develop analytical models that may readily be implemented
to practical problems.
To conclude, the results derived in this dissertation demonstrate
that management can increase project value substantially by imple-
menting investment decision rules derived from contingent claims anal-
YSIS.
Sucessful application of more sophisticated methods into the man-
agerial sphere concurrently demand extended management knowledge
of decision flexibility theory as well as suitable management tools.
The benefit of advanced methods and improved results are the ob-
vious incentives. Therefore, academia as well as management may con-
currently prosper form further development of theory as well as im-
proved practical knowledge and means of application.
Within the field of contingent claims analysis there is undoubtedly
room for further research and development.
lSee Gibson and Schwartz (1989).
2See Aase (1988).
3See Brennan (1989).
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